How Backroom Diplomacy Created a “Peace Plan” to End the War in Ukraine
The nature of the controversial “28-point plan” to end the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is becoming increasingly clear, namely how it appeared and why it all came to the point that it looked like an American ultimatum to Ukraine.
A short “spoiler”: the Russian side cynically used Trump’s real aspirations to end the war as soon as possible and a certain organizational chaos within the presidential administration to achieve its own goals. At the same time, the Russians themselves probably did not expect the war to end now and under the conditions set out in the plan. For them, such diplomatic manipulation by a third party is an excellent opportunity to achieve intermediate goals:
first, to once again shift responsibility for the lack of a peaceful settlement onto Ukraine, to provoke a conflict between the US and Ukraine, so that the American administration takes even more radical steps in reducing aid, up to and including the cessation of intelligence sharing;
secondly, to thwart the decision to transfer Russian “frozen assets” to Ukraine, the discussion of which is in an active stage.
The intermediate goal of Russian diplomacy: even if the plan fails in its first version, the Russian side will not agree to any others, but the main thing is that Ukraine will emerge from this political impulse in a weaker position.
Special Envoy Witkoff once again acted as a tool in this backroom diplomatic game.
Next, we will detail the chronology, circumstances, and consequences of the plot, giving answers to the most important questions.
Who is the author of the plan?
The authorship of the plan is very successfully attributed to the USA, which theoretically will allow Russia to continue to offer more advantageous additions to its structure and distance itself from the advocacy of the initiative: they say, this is the idea of the Trump Administration, let them put pressure on Ukraine, and the Russians will wait and consider.
And indeed, the further development of the situation was witnessed by the official ideologist of the plan, Witkoff, who probably started working on the draft agreement with the relative of the US President Kushner at the end of October. The only problem is that they invited the Russian, so to speak, “backroom diplomat” Dmitriev, who made a fundamental but rather destructive contribution to subvert the American Administration.
This is confirmed by the content, which is as loyal to Russian interests as possible, as well as the complete absence of a classic professional diplomatic approach in the text. The rather vague wording and atypical writing style without clear detail indicate that the plan was not the result of comprehensive work at the level of representatives of the US State Department and even the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The set of theses written by businessmen was elevated to the status of an “international document” by subsequent political actions.
Is the Trump Administration officially aware of the initiative?
It seems that Rubio, Vance, and even Trump knew that work on a “peace agreement” was underway. Moreover, the preparation of a “roadmap” for ensuring peace in Ukraine became Trump’s instruction to his team. Most likely, at the first stage of development, the Administration did not delve deeply into the content and format, but supported the idea of finding a model for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, which remains a priority for the American President. Only Witkoff showed particular activity.
As part of the “delegation of authority,” Trump probably relied entirely on his friend, and after he came to him with a proposal, in a manner typical of the American President, he decided to act “on the spur of the moment without unnecessary integration into the details.” The main thing is a quick result.
It seems that Rubio knew about the consultations of Witkoff and Dmitriev, without taking direct part in the development of the draft plan, but without being able to deny its expediency – especially when the initiative reached the level of the President and was approved.
Perhaps this is the reason for a certain chaos in the statements: when at first the congressmen publicly assure (at the security forum in Halifax) – Rubio supposedly gave them the understanding that this is not an American plan, but then suddenly the Secretary of State himself refutes the rumors.
The first rule for employees of the American administration – do not let Trump down. Even if Trump’s positive peace aspirations are blocked due to Putin’s destructive position, the US Secretary of State needs to explain this to his President carefully and thoughtfully.
Quite predictably in October, Rubio gave Trump the understanding that there was no particular point in meeting with the Russians in Hungary due to their maximalist demands and lack of potential for compromise.
If Rubio were to question Witkoff’s “peaceful attempts” here, the risk would increase that Trump would have questions: why is he always against it? The thoughtfulness and rationality of Rubio’s position does not exempt him from the threat of his intentions being misinterpreted by the leadership. Especially when Witkoff was inspired by the successes in the Middle East peace process and decided to move on.
In this context, Rubio’s objective position is interesting: either he is simply performing his function as a professional official (not having much faith in the implementation of the initiative in such a format) or he is guided by political motives so that Trump can see that Witkoff’s proposals do not give the expected result on this track, the approach is wrong, and the credit for his trust in organizing work with the Russians is running out.
It would be better for Trump to be disappointed in Witkoff for his controversial diplomacy than in Rubio for blocking initiatives – and then the Secretary of State might strengthen his own apparatus positions, pushing other situational “diplomats” out of his track.
Given the circumstances, Rubio did not exactly support, but did not oppose the “peace plan” and began work within his own competence.
In turn, Trump approved further steps, which turned the draft authored by Witkoff-Kushner-Dmitriev into a full-fledged initiative of the US Administration.
However, it seems that this idea also found support from Vice President Vance, who continues to demonstrate a rather skeptical position regarding the possibility of forcing Russia to negotiate by further economic pressure or supplying weapons to Ukraine. Vance actively seized on the specified plan and even took advantage of this circumstance to involve his classmate, Secretary of the Army Driscoll, who had already effectively replaced Kellogg, in the negotiations.
Everyone pursued their own operational goals, but there was no integrity in the final expectations from the US, which contributes to different interpretations and casts doubt on the certainty of the result.
The influence of political circumstances: the ideal moment to put pressure on Ukraine?
Probably, one of the arguments from Witkoff regarding the need for immediate advocacy of the proposals was the domestic political situation in Ukraine. Indeed, the corruption scandal in the energy sector (with a possible development of the plot in the defense sector as well), to put it mildly, raised many questions. The positions of the authorities have indeed been shaken, and the individuals involved in the embezzlement have caused damage not only to state interests, but also complicated the situation for the President. Trust has also been shaken within his own party, and there is a risk of losing control over the Parliament. It is not surprising that the Trump team could have had the idea: Zelensky is in a weak position, which means he must agree. Even the methods used were the same as those used in the first stages of the negotiations on the “mineral agreement”: an aggressive negotiating approach with an ultimatum on the terms. It is interesting that the American media insisted that Ukraine was also involved in the development of the agreement: allegedly consultations were held with the Secretary of the Security Council Umerov. The very fact of such contacts can definitely be believed, but there are questions about whether they were based on understanding between the parties. It is not exceptional that at first the same Witkoff wished for the real, and then realized that the President of Ukraine would not agree to such a reaction (which probably led to the breakdown of the meeting in Turkey the day before).
In any case, even if we assume that individual representatives of the Ukrainian political establishment were also involved in the preparation of the “peace plan” or were engaged in its advocacy at later stages, the question of their mandate for such an action remains open.
The meeting in Geneva demonstrated the official position of the Ukrainian side and Zelensky’s intentions, which do not envisage the implementation of Witkoff’s proposal in the initial version. Trump himself made corrections to the “draft” and the Ukrainian side is taking advantage of this.
What are the consequences for Ukraine?
Although the Trump Administration is trying to distance the EU from the negotiation process this time, Ukraine will continue to focus on the diplomatic support of European partners. At least in those provisions that concern European security, and not only Ukraine.
The Ukrainian side has demonstrated its own readiness for negotiations, but its focus on the details that can ensure a stable and just peace. That is why the most problematic aspects of the agreement – such as the point on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from positions in the Donetsk region – have been transferred to the level of discussion of the Presidents.
In addition to achieving real progress in the peace settlement, it is still critically important for Ukraine to prevent a conflict with Trump and find opportunities to convey the Ukrainian position to the US President.
Despite the fact that there have been signals about the US readiness to further reduce support, Ukrainian hopes are focused on the rationality and approaches of the Trump Administration and the Republican electorate, which supports assistance to Ukraine and, judging by sociological polls, the positive dynamics are growing.
Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated to its American partners its own readiness for a peace process, the basis of which is an agreement on an unconditional, immediate and comprehensive ceasefire. There are certainly opportunities for agreeing on a new “road map” for ensuring peace based on proposals from the US, if it takes into account Ukrainian interests regarding security guarantees, prevents a new escalation, and prevents the recognition of the occupation of territories by the aggressor using force.
The fact that, despite the primary ultimatum, the US is open to the negotiation process gives reason for optimism. The first version of the plan has already lost its right to exist, which means that there are grounds for further consultations taking into account Ukrainian interests.
Peculiarities of Russian backroom diplomacy.
After the breakdown of the meeting in Hungary, the Russians still managed to set a certain tone for the negotiation process on Ukraine through work in the Dmitriev-Witkoff format.
Interestingly, despite all the diplomatic impulses of the United States, the Russians gave a clear understanding of their own determination to continue hostilities, and Putin’s recent meeting with the military command is only additional confirmation. If the Kremlin believes that they have the initiative on the battlefield, and there will be a political crisis in Ukraine, why should they make peaceful compromises? The question is rhetorical.
That is why the Russian side is not interested in Trump’s real and positive intentions to end the war. On the contrary. They seek to use the situation for their own purposes in order to gain an additional victory on the battlefield.
For the Russian side, the option of reaching an agreement at the negotiating table is not on the agenda, so they do not deviate from maximalist demands both at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the course of Dmitriev’s “shadow diplomacy”.
They are interested in the fact that their imitation of the “peace process” will lead to a confrontation between Kyiv and Washington and the distancing of the US from helping Ukraine, which will allow the Russian army to seize new territories.
In addition, the Russians see an opportunity to use the above situation to provoke contradictions between the US and the EU, as well as to prejudge the decision to transfer frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.
While Kyiv is thinking about how to achieve a fair and reliable peace, Washington is thinking about how to speed up a peaceful solution, and Moscow is thinking about how to use negotiations to strengthen its own positions in the war. Everyone is showing interest in diplomacy, but with different goals.