Will relations between Ukraine and Poland improve?
Against the backdrop of the crisis events of June, in August, certain counter-steps towards de-escalation are observed between Ukraine and Poland. It is too early to draw final conclusions, but certain positive signals are already on the surface.
Firstly, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s working meeting in July with the participation of senior officials of the country from various spheres of state administration, announcing diplomatic, political and humanitarian steps to stabilize relations with Polish partners.
Secondly, the stopover of the President of Ukraine in Lublin on his return from the USA and a meeting with Prime Minister Donald Tusk to discuss important topics of bilateral cooperation.
Thirdly, diplomatic activation – the visit of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Marcin Bosacki to Lviv and a longer trip of the Commissioner for the Reconstruction of Ukraine Pawel Kowal, the meeting of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk with the Marlasek of the Polish Sejm Władysław Czaszty.
Work is underway to restore constructive dialogue and overcome conflict situations.
In general, Ukraine and Poland really need to develop a new conceptual model of relations on a mutually beneficial basis.
However, in order to form the right approach to future Ukrainian policy, several questions need to be answered correctly.
First, is it possible to find a final understanding in the historical sphere?
At least – at this stage – no.
Even the positive content of the meeting of the speakers of the parliaments of Ukraine and Poland was remembered by the public statement of the Polish colleague, where he used the phrase “genocide must be recognized as genocide” when reflecting on the difficult pages of history.
The Ukrainian information field has already perceived the above phrase in such a way that the requirement for Ukraine’s accession to the EU will be the recognition by the Ukrainian side of the events in Volhynia in 1943-1944 as genocide. In some places, even interpreting the quote somewhat.
Although the Polish parliamentarian did not speak specifically about the “requirement” as such, between the lines of his phrases one can clearly trace a trend: even the most loyal political force to Ukraine cannot fully accept the Ukrainian vision of history.
Thus, Władysław Czaszysty visited Ukrainian citizens who were beaten in Poland due to xenophobic motives, publicly called for an end to persecution based on nationality, but on the issue of history, he speaks from a different position.
To be objective, there is no political force in Poland that would have a positive attitude towards the activities of the UPA. The difference lies only in the approaches: it is important for the government to focus on strategic issues of interaction in the economic and security spheres, and to postpone the topic of history. A similar vision is situationally shared by other coalition members.
At the same time, for the opposition political forces – “PiS” and “Confederation” – it seems better to conduct provocative discussions on the issue here and now, while it allows mobilizing their own electorate.
That is why, the team of Prime Minister Donald Tusk would prefer not to pay much resonance to historical disputes, and President Karol Nawrocki, on the contrary, decided to use the situation to the maximum with political overtones.
Interestingly, even the leader of the newly created parliamentary club “Development Plus” Mateusz Morawiecki – who is critical of the anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of some colleagues from “PiS” – does not deviate from the conservative line on issues of historical policy.
Thus, the Ukrainian leadership has taken a fundamental step for the development of humanitarian cooperation, launching the exhumations of the victims of the Volyn tragedy.
However, the active politicization of historical issues by individual political forces diverts attention from other narratives and statements, using the historical memory of Polish society against the actions of the current Ukrainian authorities.
Where the parties should have achieved reconciliation, the strategic partnership suddenly becomes a hostage to history. Therefore, postponing discussions on complex issues really looks like a rational, albeit temporary, way out of the situation.
Secondly, what will Poland be like after the 2027 parliamentary elections?
In the fall of 2027, the parliamentary elections will indeed be of strategic importance for Poland. Currently, the “Civil Coalition” led by Donald Tusk claims first place with a result within 30%, but feels a problem with potential partners for the coalition.
If the “Left” continues to maintain a passing result of over 7%, then the “PSL” of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Władysław Kosyniak-Kamyś is outside the rescue indicator of 5%.
As of now, there are more chances for a revenge scenario for right-wing forces. At present, its final configurations are not known, since the leadership of the “PiS” declared its unwillingness to enter into an alliance with the marginal Grzegorz Braun, and his “Confederation of the Polish Crown” is stable in the range of 6-8%.
The situation with the project of Mateusz Morawiecki “Development Plus” will also have a separate impact, if it participates as an independent political force – the chances of passing into the Sejm are quite high.
Discussions have even begun on the implementation of the difficult task of forming a single list of right-wing forces, where Karol Nawrocki will play the role of a key mediator.
In any case, the option of forming a conservative majority and a right-wing government seems quite real.
Of course, Donald Tusk will make every effort to retain power and retains some hopes. However, Ukraine should take into account all options for the development of events.
In this case, for the strategic interests of official Kyiv, it does not seem advisable to aggravate relations with the current government (which also acts from pragmatic positions and tries to prevent a critical deterioration of relations) either now or if they remain in power. However, we would also not want to lay the foundation for a radical confrontation with potential right-wing governments and majorities through joint actions.
Thirdly, what distribution of priorities seems correct in relations with Poland?
Ukraine and Poland continue to represent a strategic value for each other. There are still enough promising areas where both countries can gain economic, security and political benefits. It is worth expecting the intensification of negotiations on the restoration of Ukrainian transit through Polish territory in the conditions of a difficult situation with shelling of sea port infrastructure. Polish companies continue to retain interest not only in exporting their own products to the Ukrainian market, but also in creating conditions for investments in projects for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Ukrainian military experience continues to be of considerable interest to the Polish military, provided that they correctly assess the state of affairs on the modern battlefield. The expansion of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation in the economic and security spheres will serve as a reliable foundation for deterring Russian interests and strengthening the role and status of both states in the European arena.
Historical issues will certainly require pragmatic coordination on the path of Ukraine’s European integration – without emotions, politicization and speculation. The above topic will become even more relevant as the moment of Ukraine’s actual accession to the EU approaches, but until then there is still enough work to be done to open negotiation clusters, maintain a European consensus on sanctions policy against the Russian economy, ensure Ukraine’s need to deter Russian aggression and achieve a just peace in the war.
In this context, it is advisable for Ukraine and Poland to act as allies. Moreover, even if the Polish government seeks to minimize tension in matters of historical policy, what can we say about the frequent cases of crimes against Ukrainian citizens in Poland on the basis of xenophobia provoked on the basis of political populism? Polish partners understand that the radicalization of certain elements of their own population creates significant internal political problems within the country and threatens to bring the issue to the European level, and Poland will lose its reputation as a consistent defender of democratic values in the EU.
Thus, in bilateral relations, there remain significantly more pressing issues where we should act as allies than those aspects where final understanding will be better sought over time.
The window for improving relations remains open, but the question of whether it will be possible to use it properly remains open.