The presidential elections in France in the spring of 2027 will be of fundamental importance for Ukrainian interests.
First, Emmanuel Macron’s second term is gradually coming to an end and he will not be able to run for a new term.
Of course, his actions periodically caused the effect of “strategic uncertainty” not only in the Kremlin, but also in Kyiv, and political declarations sometimes exceeded practical actions. However, in general, the French leader took a consistent position on the issue of political and military assistance to Ukraine, proposed a number of constructive diplomatic initiatives – as a “coalition of the determined”, and facilitated the establishment of contacts with Donald Trump until he himself got into the turbulence of the American administration’s diplomacy. In addition, personal communication at the level of presidents took place in a positive way and France successfully fulfills the role of a strategic partner.
Secondly, despite the difficult internal political and economic situation, France remains a driving force in the policy of supporting Ukraine alongside Germany and Britain. A dangerous scenario for Ukraine would be the loss of allied relations with at least one part of this strategic geopolitical triangle.
Thirdly, while sociological polls do not give enough optimism, and the leader with the chances of victory is Marine Le Pen, the leader of the “National Union”, who did not demonstrate any special pro-Ukrainian intentions in her previous declarations. If we take into account that the key place in the French power hierarchy is occupied by the president, the situation may become even more uncertain with unpredictable consequences.
However, everything in turn.
Sociology against Ukraine. Is there a risk that the pro-Ukrainian candidate will not make it to the second stage.
The large international company Toluna Harris Interactive conducted a large-scale sociological study for RTL and M6 and published several scenarios for the development of the presidential campaign as of August. The results reveal a problematic trend.
Marine Le Pen’s primacy has been discussed by experts since she was given the opportunity to participate in the elections, so the forecasts of her ratings at the level of 35% of the vote do not cause much surprise, although they provoke certain alarming moods.
The key risk of the first round of the presidential elections is the real chances of Jean-Luc Mélenchon to take second place.
The leader of “France Invincible” systematically advocates radical populist positions of the left. Although he publicly condemned the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, he has repeatedly resorted to statements such as “the collective measure led by the US provoked Russian paranoia.”
Jean-Luc Mélenchon has not demonstrated a consistent commitment to military-technical support for Ukraine. His declarations show different dynamics of the evolution of political consciousness: from denial of the supply of military equipment to recognition of Ukraine’s right to defense, but with “red lines” – so as not to drag France into war.
The politician condemned the bilateral security agreement with Ukraine and actively speculated on the electorate, which does not support a particularly active French position in deterring the Russian threat.
According to various sociological models, Jean-Luc Mélenchon claims 17% of the vote, which makes him the main contender for passing to the second round together with Marine Le Pen.
With all due respect to both, but such a scenario, to put it mildly, does not cause much optimism in Ukraine. Two candidates with a rather ambiguous reputation and position on the war and the vision of the future of Europe as a whole. To organize work with both, it is necessary to make titanic efforts and the result will not be guaranteed. Therefore, the competition in the second round of candidates who are too restrained in the issue of supporting Ukraine is a dangerous option.
Relative positive: the possibility of avoiding such a risk remains.
Who is claiming the presidential seat from the pro-Ukrainian camp?
Currently, there are three active presidential candidates in France, whose campaign, de facto, promises to turn into a confrontation with the right-wing forces led by Marine Le Pen.
Firstly, the former Prime Minister of France, leader of the Horizon party, mayor of Le Havre Edouard Philippe.
He is called the main opponent who will be able to reach the political center, to the supporters of the current French president, as well as unite voters who cast their votes for representatives of the left-wing camp in the last parliamentary elections.
Edouard Philippe is being portrayed as a state administrator and technocrat who has experience in leading the government, a successful case in local government bodies and a high level of support from the business community.
Secondly, the Member of the European Parliament, leader of the left-wing political force of the center-left orientation “Public Space” Raphael Glucksmann.
He is a rather bright political figure and is noted for the most pro-Ukrainian position among all the contenders. The politician gives a clear understanding that Ukraine is an outpost and the first line of defense of Europe, therefore, the creation of “red lines” in support of Ukrainian needs and pressure on the Russian aggressor is not a typical approach for Raphael Glucksmann.
Probably one of the key technological problems of the politician is that he enjoys support in the intellectual elites, but it will be difficult for him to enlist the support of the broad masses of various types of activities and views.
Thirdly, the Secretary General of the Renaissance Party, former Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, who, de jure, should have acted as a potential successor to Emmanuel Macron, but, de facto, there was a rather complicated history of relations between the two politicians, which was accompanied by certain conflicts.
Gabriel Attal demonstrates a clear and consistent position on Ukraine. At the same time, he has recently been trying to flirt with the conventional center-right electorate, seeing in himself the ability to compete for this sociological segment with Marine Le Pen.
Gabriel Attal’s interview with the French publication “Le Journal du Dimanche (JDD)” caused a rather ambiguous reaction.
The specified media resource openly expresses anti-Ukrainian views and freely provides a platform for experts and journalists, who are traditionally defined as “agents of Russian influence”. It is worth noting that the notorious Yulia Mendel recently gave an interview to this media outlet, dispelling typical propaganda strains and pro-Russian conspiracy narratives.
It is not exceptional that Gabriel Attal will try to “sit on two political chairs”: simultaneously maintaining a pro-Ukrainian course, but trying to turn the right-wing conservative electorate to his side in order to somehow increase his own chances.
“JDD”, along with other well-known online and television resources, is part of the media empire of Vincent Bolloré, a large businessman with conservative views who has often been seen ideologically sympathetic to Marine Le Pen. Given the huge audience controlled by the resources of the local French oligarch, gaining his platform is an important component of political success. Gabriel Attal probably thinks in similar categories.
Among the three politicians, Edouard Philippe has the best chance of reaching the second round, who is either on the same level as Jean-Luc Mélenchon or at a slight distance of 1-2% from him (depending on the campaign variations).
Raphael Glucksmann and Gabriel Attal are lagging behind and, according to various estimates, can claim a result in the 10% range. However, it is their participation that may be decisive for the first round.
Why? To simplify the understanding of the situation: supporters of Raphael Glucksmann or Gabriel Attal are more likely to vote for Edouard Philippe than for Marine Le Pen or Jacques-Luc Mélenchon.
This feature will become important not only at the end of the campaign, but also has the potential to influence the initial stages. If the existing sociological configurations are preserved, the participation of both risks preventing Edouard Philippe from reaching the second round and overtaking Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
Therefore, the camp of Raphael Glucksmann or Gabriel Attal will face a difficult choice: either to focus exclusively on their own ambitions or to “think about the future of France” and prevent a second round with the participation of radical right and radical left candidates.
However, in this case, one of them will have to withdraw from the campaign.
Remembering how unexpectedly and abruptly Emmanuel Macron burst onto the political Olympus earlier, we cannot rule out the scenario of a new contender emerging who will seize the palm of victory in the confrontation with Marine Le Pen. However, for now we can only expect such sensational steps.
The second round – consolidation against the right
If one of the contenders still manages to bypass Jean-Luc Mélenchon and compete with Marine Le Pen in the final – the situation will look quite difficult. Although the chances will remain subject to the successful implementation of the scenario – “anyone but a right-wing politician”.
A similar model worked in the early parliamentary elections of 2024, when the “National Union” did not win such a convincing victory, which was hoped for.
There are still options for a similar political maneuver now.
Firstly, if we take the model where Edouard Philippe will go to the second round as a basis, he has significant potential to mobilize votes. First of all, those who will support him, just so that Marine Le Pen does not win.
Secondly, it will look like a strange phenomenon if suddenly the voters of the radical left Jean-Luc Mélenchon suddenly go to vote for Marine Le Pen. Most likely, most of them will rather ignore the next round.
Thirdly, Marine Le Pen will have to fight both for the conditional voters of Emmanuel Macron, representatives of the moderate center and the center-right center, and to capture the electorate that is disappointed in the government and is looking for an acceptable alternative for itself. Otherwise, the potential to mobilize additional votes in the second round will look limited for the politician.
What will be the policy of the next French president towards Ukraine
If Edouard Philippe’s position seems more predictable and closer to Emmanuel Macron’s course, then Marine Le Pen gives more reason for reflection or worries. Especially considering that she is the favorite.
To be objective – Marine Le Pen has long been not that pro-Russian politician who did not condemn the occupation of the Crimean peninsula and demonstrated open loyalty to the development of Franco-Russian relations.
Ambitions to become a politician of a national scale prompted her to act moderately and not limit herself to a pro-Russian or marginal electoral field. This is a relative positive and opens a certain “window of opportunity” for Ukraine in the future.
As of now – as a candidate – her position is quite restrained, and sometimes destructive, if assessed solely through the prism of Ukrainian interests.
Yes, she condemns the Russian invasion, but opposes an unconditional increase in military aid to Ukraine under the pretext of countering escalation. She rules out the option of sending French peacekeepers to Ukrainian territory, which casts doubt on her real intentions to continue the “coalition of the determined” initiative.
Although the topic of peacekeepers is already quite abstract, in this case her political positioning seems indicative: support for Ukraine is allowed, but within clear frameworks and “red lines”. The politician advocates negotiations, not seeing the prerequisites for Russia’s strategic defeat. Such a restrained approach is not what we would like to hear in Ukraine in the context of the ongoing war for its own survival and terrorist attacks on the population.
However, will Marine Le Pen fully act from similar positions when she faces objective reality and becomes president? When she will receive full access to information and realize the real actions and approaches of the Russian side, as well as the full scope of the threats and imperialist ambitions of the Kremlin, which is not geographically limited to Ukraine and threatens NATO partners?
There are too many conditional factors to form a holistic forecast.
Marine Le Pen’s further vision of policy at the EU and NATO levels as a whole is also interesting. Currently, the “National Union” is part of the right-wing faction in the European Parliament “Patriots for Europe”, where together with them such parties as “Fidesz” of Viktor Orbán, “ANO” of Andrej Babiš, “Lega” of Matteo Salvini and “Confederation” of Krzysztof Bosak.
The latter even implemented an important initiative in June by organizing a visit to Poland by Marine Le Pen’s ally Jordan Bardella (who was then considered a potential presidential candidate, but is now a contender for the prime minister’s post). At that time, Jordan Bardella demonstrated ideological unity with the “Confederation” on migration issues and held a personal meeting with Polish President Karol Nawrocki. The camp of Poland’s right-wing forces does not hide its hopes for Marine Le Pen’s victory in the elections, which will provide a positive backdrop for them and for their parliamentary campaign in the fall of 2027.
At the same time, Ukraine still frankly lacks ties with Marine Le Pen or her team, so the future new Ukrainian ambassador to Paris will face a difficult task of establishing pragmatic communication.
It is advisable to develop such contacts at the political level now and with the right approach – it will not look like “contempt” for Emmanuel Macron or an attempt to “interfere in the election campaign on someone else’s side.” It is worth noting that three potential candidates from the conditional pro-Ukrainian camp have already visited Ukraine.
An excellent option would also be to organize a visit by Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardell as a candidate for the presidential and prime ministerial posts, respectively.
Without the formation of an effective strategy towards Ukraine, it is impossible to implement the foreign policy course of any country that claims leadership in Europe. A hypothetical victory for Marine Le Pen will not be an exception to this axiom.
For example, for creative reflection: given that the “National Union” is a conservative political force with nationalist values, an invitation to Jordan Bardella from the same Andriy Biletsky or another military-political figure with conservative views would be a logical political step.
As for Marine Le Pen herself, an invitation for her as a candidate for the presidency of France (on a par with other campaign participants) is also a realistic option. However, it is advisable to choose an appropriate “initiator”. For example, if Iryna Vereshchuk is still interested in positioning herself as a conservative politician, she could make a corresponding request from herself or organize a collective appeal from Ukrainian women who are carrying out heroic resistance to Russian aggression.
Ignoring such proposals seemed like the wrong decision for the French side, and the visit will be an important stage in objective awareness of what is happening in Ukraine.
In summary, there is not much time left before the presidential elections in France and Ukraine should prepare for all possible scenarios.
A potential victory for Marine Le Pen would allow her to instantly initiate the dissolution of parliament in order to concentrate all power in her own hands.
The victory of a candidate like Edouard Philippe will allow France to keep its foreign policy as close as possible to the current line of official Paris, but will not eliminate the need to resolve the domestic political crisis that continues to this day.
Knowing all the unpredictability of French politics, it is not impossible that President Emmanuel Macron will still be able to initiate another early parliamentary election before the presidential campaign. The legislation no longer limits him in this.
In any circumstances, Ukrainian diplomacy and politicians must not only observe, but also act to prevent the loss of the strategic alliance with France.