How will the results of the presidential election affect relations with Ukraine and what will happen next in Poland

Anton Naychuk, Director of the Eastern European Council
East European Council > UAPL COUNCIL > Analytics > How will the results of the presidential election affect relations with Ukraine and what will happen next in Poland

The presidential election in Poland ended with a minimal victory for the candidate from Law and Justice Karol Nawrocki, which allowed the opposition party to take some revenge for the loss of the parliamentary majority in 2023.

Despite the fact that the new President signed a memorandum with one of the leaders of the Confederation, Sławomir Mentzen, who does not allow Ukraine to join NATO, and also made a number of controversial and sometimes provocative statements regarding Ukraine’s European integration prospects – it is not time to panic.

Firstly, the key instruments for shaping the country’s political course, including on the external track, remain in the Government, and the practical functionality of the President is quite limited. It is the Prime Minister and his team who form aid packages, make strategic decisions and have a fundamental influence on foreign policy.

In addition, Karol Nawrocki’s first posts on the topic of Ukraine indicate that at least on the issue of security he will demonstrate objectivity. A stable situation in Ukraine is a strategic interest of Poland and a defeat for the Russian Federation. Objectively, it is difficult to accuse the new President of the lack of a statesmanlike position or the presence of pro-Russian sentiments.

Secondly, we have repeatedly witnessed that the Polish leadership is primarily focused on its own interests and no one will make sacrifices for the sake of Ukraine if this somehow hinders Poland.

Diplomacy has moved into the plane of harsh pragmatism and even if the candidate from the “Civil Platform” were to win, he would also act in the direction of politics – Ukraine is a security buffer from Russia, Poland will not cross “red lines” in the issue of supporting Ukraine and the like.

Therefore, under any circumstances, our relations will develop not on the basis of euphoria of unlimited partnership, but within the framework of cold calculations.

Of course, it is difficult to hope that Karol Nawrocki will continue the powerful pro-Ukrainian line on the scale of his predecessor Andrzej Duda, with whom Volodymyr Zelensky has established extremely warm political relations. However, the field for establishing communication is quite wide.

Despite the expected excellent relations of Karol Nawrocki with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, it is not yet worth assuming that he will act in a similar way towards Ukraine.

Karol Nawrocki will fully focus on the position of the Donald Trump Administration. For him, this will be a priority, which will be reflected in his approaches to Ukraine.

Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the factor that the Polish President will build ties with the so-called “MAGA” group and the entourage of his American colleague. It is unlikely that he will primarily advocate for the interests of Ukraine, but practice has shown that even Andrzej Duda’s active position on this issue did not have a cardinal impact on Donald Trump’s actions.

Thus, Ukraine will have to continue to actively work to ensure bipartisan support in Poland, where the electorate is almost equally divided between both candidates.

If the near future can be looked at without panic, then at the strategic level, there are risks that are especially worth considering.

Even if Donald Tusk manages to maintain the coalition in the face of a confrontation with the President until the next parliamentary elections, the prospects for the majority of right-wing forces to come to power in 2027 will increase.

If you look at the statistics, PiS is stably maintaining ratings at 30%, but the presidential campaign has shown that other representatives of the right-wing forces – Sławomir Mentzen and Grzegorz Braun – have gained more than 20% in total.

If the Confederation manages to maintain or even develop this result in the next parliamentary elections, the contours of a coalition of right-wing forces will clearly emerge. In this case, the Ukrainian side will have less reason for optimism.

It is also worth noting that the presidential elections are not yet the final point of the political campaign in Poland. After all, Prime Minister Donald Tusk has addressed the Sejm on the subject of a vote of confidence in the current Government.

In the base scenario, it should be approved, since the parliamentary majority still has a sufficient number of votes.

The priority plan for the current Prime Minister will be to maintain the coalition and extend the term of the Government in order to retain power and improve the situation on the eve of the next parliamentary elections in 2027.

However, from now on it is necessary to take into account all possible scenarios – even early elections – although most experts agree on their low probability.

First, certain contradictions have already begun within the coalition. Especially on the part of the Speaker of the Sejm, Szymon Hłowna, who failed the presidential campaign. He questions Donald Tusk’s decision on the vote and is looking for an opportunity to preserve his own party’s position in the Government on the eve of a large-scale reset.

Secondly, PiS does not miss the opportunity to shake the unity of the ruling parties. They have already proposed a technical government, trying to remove the party of V. Kosyniak-Kamysh “PSL” (the “Third Way” bloc) from the coalition. So far, these plans look too optimistic, but they definitely add some turbulence to the situation.

Thus, if the most likely scenario does not happen and the vote is failed (before that, Polish history knew only positive precedents of voting), Poland will stand on the threshold of early elections to the Parliament.

The situation is quite dynamic and official Kyiv should take into account that Poland will remain a reliable ally in security matters, but in other areas – the agricultural sector, European integration, historical memory – here we will feel the tough positioning of the interests of official Warsaw.

In any case, we will observe increasing pragmatism in Polish policy towards Ukraine, regardless of parliamentary configurations. The period of the “warm bath” of bilateral partnership at the beginning of a full-scale Russian invasion has been gradually running out since 2023.

This does not mean that we are moving towards a conflict like with the leadership of Hungary or Slovakia, since Poland will remain a partner supporting Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression.

However, the level of this support will directly depend on the interests of official Warsaw: where they are interconnected, everything will remain stable and promising, but where there are differences, the Polish side will act harshly. The Ukrainian foreign policy course must take this circumstance into account, especially when power in Poland will be divided between different centers.

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