Results and reasons for Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to China

Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to China became a strategically important personal event. The growth of economic, political and security dependence on the Russian Federation puts him in a difficult position: the Kremlin received additional arguments on how to dictate its terms and strengthen its influence.

The increasingly supranational project of the “Union State” looks like an instrument of Russian expansion in the Belarusian direction, which Alexander Lukashenko’s team is trying to restrain by all possible means.

Not because official Minsk suddenly decided to oppose the Russian regime, but for the purposes of political self-preservation of the Belarusian elite.

Belarus is arranging projects where it is possible to receive additional investments, write off loans or earn money, even if this involves helping the Russian military industry, but all this should exclude the threat that the Russian side will decide to initiate a change of power in Minsk to a more loyal and controlled one for itself.

In this context, the meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping was a conscious attempt to expand the field for diplomatic maneuver and leave a “window of opportunity” for partial escape from the Russian press.

What are the key needs of the Belarusian side in relations with China?

1) Security guarantees. Of course, Alexander Lukashenko publicly emphasizes a reliable security alliance with the Russian Federation. There is frequent speculation about the deployment of nuclear or other types of Russian weapons on Belarusian territory, mutual border protection, and the like.

However, not on camera, Minsk does not idealize the situation and does not avoid internal discussion: along with the solemn fight against far-fetched military threats from NATO, there is always a shadow of real danger that may come from a seemingly reliable “ally”.

Russia does not hide its own intentions to expand its influence to the point of complete control over its neighboring country.

At the same time, the implementation of its plans does not require military invasion, but can be carried out smoothly and gradually. First, through the financial component and economic expansion, later through the activation of Russian agents of influence in the Belarusian security structures, and the resolute integration of the Belarusian armed forces into the Russian system of governance. A kind of “creeping occupation” format.

Although the Belarusian authorities provide maximum assistance and assistance to the Kremlin, giving up political sovereignty and personal security guarantees for Alexander Lukashenko and his entourage is a permanent “red line”.

However, if there are no other powerful partners, who will come to the aid of Belarus at a critical moment? The only available option is China.

That is why the work on the Belarusian rapprochement with official Beijing is about security and protection.

However, not against the conditional “Western enemy”, whatever it may sound publicly, but against the unpredictable “Eastern partner”.

For Alexander Lukashenko, the ideal scenario is one in which China will include Belarus among the strategic assets of its own foreign policy, following the example of the countries of Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan.

The local republics are in a similar situation: they are actively engaged in economic cooperation with Russia, but remain concerned about the possibility of Russian imperialism in their direction.

In this context, China acts as an unofficial guarantor for them, which clearly draws the lines: any attempts at Russian military-political expansion into the Central Asian region will receive an appropriate response from Beijing.

Alexander Lukashenko is fighting for a similar format of support.

2) Chinese transit interests in Belarus. A similar request from Minsk will not be ignored in China, since Chinese transit interests pass through Belarusian territory to Poland.

The fact is that the huge dry port in Malashevichi acts as a kind of gateway for China to the European market.

The Polish leadership has realized how to use this factor to indirectly influence Belarus. As soon as there is an escalation on the border with Poland, Polish diplomats inform their Chinese colleagues about the need to stabilize it and begin various organizational activities that delay the operation of the transit hub.

Beijing’s reaction is consistent: in Minsk they receive a clear signal that provocations must be stopped, regardless of whether they are carried out by Belarusian or Russian special services.

In this context, it is important for China that the Belarusian path to Europe does not suffer any oppression or restrictions.

At the same time, official Warsaw, through joint actions of the President and the Government, made it clear that Poland is ready to provide assistance in ensuring stable exports of Chinese products to the European vector in exchange for China’s assistance in maintaining Belarus in a stable and secure regime.

The visit has become particularly relevant against the background of preparations for the military exercises “West – 2025”, which are technically supposed to take place in the fall, but their organization is not ruled out sooner – at the end of the summer.

It is important for China that this event does not become a cover for military provocations and escalation, as this will lead to a corresponding reaction from Poland, and therefore will cause damage to Chinese transit.

Oddly enough, here Chinese interests coincide with Belarusian ones, since for Alexander Lukashenko himself, any exercises with the presence of a significant number of Russian troops on his own territory are a risk with unpredictable consequences.

Probably, the subject of bilateral negotiations in Beijing was precisely the involvement of the Chinese side in monitoring the situation in the status of a kind of deterrent factor.

3) The issue of economic interaction. Bilateral economic projects and the Big Stone industrial park are not developing at the pace expected in Minsk or Beijing. At the same time, limiting itself exclusively to loans from Russia puts Alexander Lukashenko in an even more difficult situation.

That is why it is important for the Belarusian side to find new niches that may interest Chinese investors and open credit lines from Chinese banks, as well as expand exports of a strategic Belarusian asset – potash fertilizers.

If China buys them in larger volumes, it will be more difficult for the Russian side to restrict their transit through its own territory, which is often used by the Russian regime as an additional tool of political pressure on Belarus.

What are the conclusions for Ukraine?

First, the potential achievement of agreements on involving China in monitoring the West 2025 exercises or organizing joint actions between the Chinese and Belarusian armies in the same timeframe is a certain deterrent.

In this case, Russia will receive a clear signal from Beijing that further escalation from Belarusian territory will cause dissatisfaction on the Chinese side.

Secondly, the intensification of the dialogue between Minsk and Beijing is an additional argument in favor of the fact that even the hypothetical thoughts of the Kremlin regarding repeated military actions against Ukraine from Belarusian territory or the direct involvement of the Belarusian army in military operations will also receive critical assessments in Beijing.

China will take measures to prevent such a scenario, fearing problems with the continuation of uninterrupted exports of Chinese products to European markets through Belarus.

Thus, Alexander Lukashenko continues to look for attempts to maneuver within the framework of political self-preservation, and the visit to China has become an important element of such a strategy.

If the door to Europe seems closed, and it is not possible to establish substantive contacts with the Donald Trump Administration, the only option that can partially save him from full Russian expansion remains China.