Conclusions on the eve of the NATO summit: will it realize Ukraine’s hopes?

Anton Naichuk, Ph.D, the head of East European Council

A number of intermediate conclusions can already be drawn on the eve of the NATO summit in Washington. The decisions will look “moderately positive” for the Ukrainian side.

First, there is noticeable progress in approving annual support for Ukraine at the level of 40 billion dollars. This is definitely an important practical decision. A war of attrition requires systematic financial and military-technical support, and even its completion will require providing Ukraine with sufficient resources to strengthen its defense capabilities. In a conceptual sense, only a strong, stable and stable Ukraine is a guarantee that NATO’s eastern flank is protected, and the threat of a new escalation is preempted.

         That is why long-term guarantees of support are important for Ukraine. This idea was presented by the Yermak-Rasmussen working group: NATO member states can annually provide a moderate part of the budget for maintaining the operational capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces.

This idea can be developed in the future: if Ukraine acts as an outpost of support for European security, without being part of NATO, then why does not a mechanism have the right to exist, according to which the annual security payments of the Alliance members will not include part of the costs for Ukrainian needs?

If conditional France, Germany or Spain transfer weapons to Ukraine and they will be practically used on the front line, this will be no less important security investment than the allocation of funds within the limits of obligations as a member of the Alliance.

Secondly, NATO plans to ensure greater control and coordination in the process of supporting Ukraine, which involves the creation of a powerful mission in Wiesbaden. Its functionality will include the development of strategic communication with Ukraine, the implementation of systematic support, and the fulfillment of tasks to ensure Ukrainian needs.

Theoretically, such a decision will have positive consequences. Ideally, political and military-technical support for Ukraine should not depend on the political situation in one or another country.

However, it is worth remembering that NATO is not a private military campaign that has its own weapons and can freely use or transfer them. NATO is an international alliance that can only provide a platform for consultations regarding Ukraine and call on the member states of the Alliance to show consistency in assistance.

NATO’s function is strategically important, but the ability to apply it in practice has limits. A demonstrative example is Hungary: if the country’s leadership does not express its intention to provide weapons, NATO does not have sufficient tools to force it to do so.

Thirdly, there will be no such official invitation, which is desirable for Ukraine. As before, the restrained position of the key players of the Alliance does not allow achieving noticeable progress in this area.

We can expect new general formulations about the mandatory accession of Ukraine at the time of full readiness and the end of the war. However, the summit in Washington will not give a clear answer to the question: when will Ukraine join NATO. Everyone will be able to choose the closest answer for themselves: after the end of the war or in 10 years, as Jens Stoltenberg allows.

Fourthly, the NATO summit is expected to be an important stage in the context of providing Ukraine with additional air defense systems and at this stage it will become no less important than all other expectations of the Ukrainian side.