Election campaign and prospects of “democratization” of Kazakhstan
Editorial article
Transit of power
After the collapse of the USSR, an authoritarian political system was formed in Kazakhstan led by the unchanging leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, who even received the status of the father of the nation – “Yelbasy”. After almost 30 years of rule, it seemed that Nazarbayev would resort to the principle of transferring power to representatives of his family, traditional for many Central Asian states, but something else happened.
The new head of the country in 2019 was elected the then chairman of the Senate, Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, as a result of the so-called transit of power, which was launched due to the formal self-removal of Nazarbayev in favor of Tokayev, and was legitimized by the victory of the latter in the early presidential elections with the result of a “modest” 70% of the votes . However, Tokayev’s real powers at that time were significantly limited due to the preservation of a huge part of the influence of Nazarbayev personally and representatives of his clan, which was called “the family” in the opposition media.
As a result of the transit, Nazarbayev retained the status of the chairman of the reformed Security Council, which actually transferred his status to the level of a guarantor or balancer with a huge amount of authority, and the daughter of the first president, Dariga Nazarbayev, was elected to the post of speaker of the Senate, who became one of the most prominent representatives ” family”. Dariga Nazarbaeva had huge political ambitions and aspired to take the position of her father, but she clearly lost the fight among the elites, since even the purely formal appointment of a woman as the leader of an Asian state with an overwhelming majority of the Muslim population was determined by the local elites to be a rather risky step.
In this way, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev became the second leader of the state in recent history, but he did not like the real status of “Speaker Nazarbayev”, which became clear almost immediately and led to the predicted confrontation with the “family”.
Tokayev’s first presidential term and the “January” protests
In 2019, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev began a serious personnel purge in an effort to get rid of Nazarbayev’s people almost immediately after being elected president of Kazakhstan, which in turn led to an escalation of the confrontation. Tokayev removed from the post of state secretary Marat Tazhyn (curator of the ideological bloc and Nazarbayev’s adviser on political issues – an analogue of Vladyslav Surkov in the Russian Federation), who was replaced by Krymbek Kusherbayev, loyal to Tokayev.
The administration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan was headed by Yerlan Koshanov, who previously worked in Tokayev’s office during his tenure as prime minister. Roman Sklyar was appointed to the post of deputy prime minister, at that time Askar Mamin. Sklyar had to balance the position of Nursultan Nazarbayev in the Government, who maintained almost complete control over Mamin. To strengthen the position of Roman Sklyar, another associate of Tokayev Galymzhan Koishibaev was appointed to the position of head of the Office of the Prime Minister Askar Mamin. While Mukhtar Tleuberdi, another person from Tokayev’s entourage, became the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar perturbations were characteristic of most institutions, starting with the national and ending with all regional levels.
This was accompanied in some places by corruption scandals and criminal proceedings, which were loud for Kazakhstan, which in the period from the end of 2019 to the beginning of 2022 turned into a system of a kind of dual power, which was characterized by the confrontation of the two largest clans – Nazarbayev and Tokayev.
In 2021, the situation escalated as much as possible, and the country actually began an extended analogue of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, where Nikita Khrushchev criticized the cult of Stalin’s personality. In essence, Tokayev began to do the same through the controlled media, which produced hundreds of materials about the corruption of the highest officials of the era of Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the slogan of the new government actually became: “not like under Nazarbayev.”
In the end, this caused an increase in tension in the middle of society between supporters of Nazarbayev and Tokayev, which led to a real explosion in January 2022. The trigger was a significant increase in the cost of fuel, which caused mass protests throughout the state. However, it is also obvious that the representatives of the Nazarbayev clan tried to support the protesters by all possible means. In fact, social protests served as an excuse for Tokayev to completely wipe out the “family”, which was implemented in practice. The key hit was against Yelbasa, his daughter Dariza Nazarbayeva, the ex-president’s nephew and, by a happy coincidence, the deputy head of the KNB RK (National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan) Samat Abish, who was accused of preparing protests in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan’s largest city. All the most influential officials and politicians who remained loyal to the Nazarbayev clan fell under the so-called “cleansing”.
To contain the situation in the middle of Kazakhstan, Tokayev even turned to the Kremlin for situational assistance, after which the Russian Federation, under the guise of the CSTO, sent a Russian peacekeeping contingent for the first time in history to fight against disorder. In fact, there is no mention of the active use of CSTO/RF units in the fight against protesters – it was more a demonstration of Tokayev’s support for supporters of the “family” and Nursultan Nazarbayev personally. Later, the contingent was withdrawn, including because of Tokayev’s close relations with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China and Turkey – Xi Jinping and Recep Erdogan, respectively, but the very fact of the involvement of foreign security forces left a huge impression among the Kazakhs.
At the same time, people loyal to Tokayev received more powers and finally secured de facto power. Yerlan Koshanov, who previously headed the Presidential Administration, was elected chairman of the Majilis (the lower house of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan). After the mentioned protests, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev formally headed the ruling party “Nur Otan” instead of Nursultan Nazarbayev, changing its name to “Amanat”. However, Tokayev almost immediately transferred the authority of the party chairman to the speaker of Majilis, Yerlan Koshanov, who eventually turned into one of the most influential political figures in Kazakhstan. Roman Sklyar became the first deputy prime minister, while Alikhan Smailov, ex-head of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, received the vacant chair of the Prime Minister.
Subsequently, Kasym-Jomart Tokayev initiated a referendum on amendments to the Constitution, which was more demonstrative in nature. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine and strong international support opened opportunities for the official Astana (the capital returned to its old name instead of Nur-Sultan) to change the geopolitical course – this required economic reforms and at least formal liberalization of the regime.
What to expect from the presidential elections?
In mid-October, the registration of candidates for the post of president was completed and the election campaign was launched, which will end in a month – on November 20. It can already be noted that six candidates will formally take part in the elections – the current head of state Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, Zhiguli Dayrabayev, Meiram Kazhiken, Nurlan Auesbayev, Karakat Abden and Saltanat Tursynbekova.
If Tokaev does not need a special introduction, then I suggest going through the rest of the candidates in more detail:
- Zhiguli Dairabaev – head of the Association of Farmers of Kazakhstan. He represents the People’s Democratic Party “Auyl” (translated from Kazakh – “village”), although not so long ago he was in the party “Amanat”. In the last parliamentary elections in 2021, the “Auil” party received the highest rate of support for the entire period of its existence – 5.2%, but this was not enough to overcome the 7% threshold and enter the parliament.
- Meiram Kazhiken – represents the Republican Union of Trade Unions “Amanat” (a purely formal candidate).
- Nurlan Auesbayev is an activist who is known for demanding the restoration of a monument to Vladimir Lenin in Astana, and in last year’s parliamentary elections the political force he represents (the All-National Social Democratic Party) simply refused to participate in the campaign, although independent sociological studies testified to real chances of passing to the parliament. Moreover, in these elections, Ausbaev is considered the only partially opposition candidate.
- Karakat Abden is one of two women participating in the elections. Represents the National Alliance of Professional Social Workers of Kazakhstan, about which practically nothing is known even in Kazakhstan itself. In 2019, she published the scandalous book “You are a Cossack. Be proud!”, in which she called on women to better learn how to run a household in order to preserve the traditional family structure.
- Saltanat Tursynbekova is the second woman running for the post of president. Deputy head of the National Commission for Women’s Affairs and Family Demographic Policy under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan K.Zh. Tokaev Represented by the Republican Public Association “Kazakh Mothers – the Way to Traditions”.
In general, the presidential elections in Kazakhstan are more like an outright farce, without the slightest hint of competition. All five of Tokayev’s registered opponents are absolute names that were not even known to the general public. It is impossible to say that at least one of them will be able to gain at least 5% (although even such a result for each of the mentioned opponents of Tokayev would be fantastic).
Therefore, on November 20, we are waiting for the confident victory of the current head of Kazakhstan, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, with an approximate indicator of “support” of 90% of the vote, no less.
Kazakhstan: current situation and development prospects