Ending the War Strategy: Why Ukraine and Europe Need a Common Vision and What Might It Look Like? Part 1
The shared interest of Ukraine and Europe is to end the war and create a new, reliable security architecture. Such coordination is particularly important in light of the new US foreign policy doctrine. However, is there a realistic possibility of a complete understanding of what the final outcome should look like?
Evolution of European Plans
The traditional approach of European diplomacy—supporting Ukraine for as long as it needs it—is insufficient to detail an effective strategy.
At the very least, this is because the war has existential significance for Ukrainians. This means that this need will always remain—until reliable mechanisms are developed to end the active phase of hostilities and prevent their resumption in the future.
It’s no secret that in Europe, people are even afraid to discuss the formula “a victory for Ukraine is equal to the dissolution of the Russian Federation.” Okay, but European politicians still haven’t proposed an effective model that could bring lasting peace and stability, where Russia’s integrity won’t threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty.
At the same time, it’s important to remember that the key to negotiations or “peace plans” involving Russians is for any formula to be more than just a memorandum on paper, but also clear arguments “on the ground”—ones that can effectively repel potential air attacks or prevent the physical penetration of aggressor troops into new territories, as well as logistics.
Unfortunately, a major problem remains the lack of a unified perception of the Russo-Ukrainian war among European countries as a whole, as well as different approaches to the concept of the “Russian threat.” Of course, those closer to the fighting, and especially those sharing a common border, better assess the risks and demonstrate greater resolve to act than those thousands of kilometers away. This also applies to those who generally prioritize private interests over collective security. The European approach to war is also significantly influenced by thinking within the framework of Euro-Atlantic security values, where membership in a complex NATO would seem to move European partners beyond the realm of risk and into a zone of safety. However, this approach is harmful and misguided. Moreover, the seemingly clearly defined provisions of NATO’s Article 5 are gradually being eroded by the unconvincing actions of American diplomacy and the aggressive provocations of the Russian Federation. The Alliance’s security guarantees sometimes appear less like a guaranteed constant and more like a situational variable that can manifest itself in different ways depending on how events unfold in practice.
The Russian leadership’s capacity for irrational thinking when making geopolitical decisions makes any escalation scenario realistic. If yesterday we couldn’t imagine Russian drones entering NATO airspace or saboteurs sabotaging a railway track within the Alliance, then where is the certainty that tomorrow “little green men” without Russian symbols won’t initiate the seizure of a city in the Baltics or launch drones armed with warheads against infrastructure or strategic objectives?
If China is actively studying Russian warfare and adapting it to modernize its own armed forces and their capabilities, the question of whether it would be appropriate for Europe to undertake similar actions in cooperation with Ukraine becomes rhetorical.
As long as Russia is convinced that Europe is unprepared for modern warfare, it will keep the option of military escalation on the table.
Under these circumstances, it would be appropriate for European countries to view Ukraine not simply as a country waging a heroic struggle for survival beyond NATO’s virtual borders, but as a strategic partner for the modernization of its own military potential and a security donor in the region.