International overview from the head of East European Council Anton Naichuk
The situation with the counterattack: will the expected results be achieved? How do our partners react to the rate of liberation of territories?
The only joint result expected by the entire Ukrainian population is the complete de-occupation of the sovereign territories within 1991 – a strategic goal to which everyone strives and everyone makes efforts in their own direction.
How quickly can it be achieved? As far as I’m concerned, even the military-political command does not predict with an accuracy of a month or a year as to when this will happen. This is not a short-term issue that depends on many factors:
– pace of arms supply. After all, our partners have not yet fulfilled their earlier promises regarding the number of artillery shells and tanks. For a very long time we have to fight for planes to reduce Russian dominance in the sky. For example, Ka-52 military helicopters cause a lot of trouble and are actively used by the Russians on the battlefield to disrupt the offensive pace of Ukrainian forces;
– the effectiveness and skill of management decisions of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which cannot be doubted in the second year of the war;
– readiness and stability of the hostile side. Let’s admit that the Russian army still maintains a high level of combat capability, has built enough fortifications on key defense lines, and at this stage has temporarily resolved the issue of personnel shortages. These factors make it difficult for Ukrainian troops to advance, and no one is underestimating the enemy.
It is expected that the active phase of hostilities will continue next year, and our Western partners have a corresponding understanding.
I am skeptical of statements about the slow pace of offensive actions, since the last battles of this scale took place in the middle of the last century, and it is difficult to imagine that someone with an objective view of things could hope that everything would happen as quickly as in the Kharkiv region. Ukrainian troops are overcoming unprecedented obstacles, doing what no other army in the world has done and in the time frames that they consider necessary and given the conditions.
Elections in the USA next year: will it be possible to maintain a sufficient level of support for Ukraine? Was the current administration of J. Biden not disappointed in the situation in Ukraine?
At this stage, I see no signs of disillusionment or abandonment of the chosen political course. In my opinion, the minimum program for the American side will be Ukraine’s liberation of the southern regions, restoration of access to the port infrastructure, destruction of the land corridor to Crimea, and control of Ukrainian troops to the border of the peninsula. There are reasons to believe that the USA will provide the necessary support for Ukraine to achieve these minimum goals by all possible methods.
What’s next? I don’t want to rush ahead. If you are talking about the liberation of Crimea, the position of our partners will depend on the results of the military campaign in the approximate range of spring 2024.
Regarding the de-occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, it is also difficult to predict. I would venture to assume that the priority for the US at the moment is the liberation of the continental south, and then depending on the situation.
I cannot form a reliable forecast regarding the situation in the USA after 2024. Many are already giving the presidential chair to Donald Trump and there are significant grounds for such assessments. However, let’s not get ahead of events. First, last year at the midterm elections, it was already predicted that the Republicans would completely capture the Parliament from the Democrats. However, it was not possible to “capture” two chambers. Let’s see what will happen in 2024 in the presidential and parliamentary contests. I have no 100% guarantees that Joe Biden will again be the main candidate from the Democrats. I assume that party influence groups and voters will bet on someone else.
In any scenario, one should not think that US aid will be at its maximum for decades and one should prepare for the fact that one day Ukraine will need to rely more on its own technological resources and potential.
That is why it is very important to think not only about the volumes of liberated territories, but also about the effectiveness of military industrial development programs. It is important that Western partners do not just allocate funds, but rather invest in joint production, creating conditions for greater independence of Ukraine in the matter of its own military and technical support.
China on the side of the Russian Federation?
China is on the side of its own national interests. I do not think that China is interested in Russia suffering a crushing defeat in Ukraine, and democratic changes or transformation of the ruling regime taking place inside the country. China does not seek to have a problem on its borders, and an internationally isolated Russia, a much larger and more powerful version of North Korea, which will also be energetically and politically dependent on China’s position, is an excellent option.
In addition, China uses the situation to achieve its own goals as much as possible. Remember Beijing’s peace plan. For all good and against all bad. Why so? Because China wanted to maintain a basis for communication with the countries of the European Union and to oppose itself to the US as a supposed “peacemaker opposing the American hawkish position” in order to make a good image for the countries of the “Global South”.
In addition, when Russia declares the need for a multipolar world and an end to the dominance of the United States, it performs the role of a mouthpiece and a battering ram for Chinese global interests.
No matter how cynical it sounds, the war in Ukraine is exhausting the military potential of the US and its allies, not China. In the existing circumstances, for Beijing, military force, even without its direct use, can become a tool of diplomacy and defense of its own interests. Regarding the same Taiwan.
Therefore, I do not want to say that China is completely on the side of Russia. In certain issues, Ukraine needs to look for arguments on how to change the state of affairs.
Sometimes Russia itself finds “arguments”. I am convinced that Beijing was not satisfied with the actions of the Russian leadership in deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus, violating the principle of non-proliferation. I believe that China does not like the involvement of Belarus in Russian actions. Especially if the Brest-Terespol railway checkpoint will be closed, which will continue to serve as one of the gateways for Chinese products to Europe. I doubt that China overlooked Russia’s withdrawal from the “grain agreement” despite Beijing’s position and considering the fact that it was the main buyer of Ukrainian agricultural products.
So far, these factors are not enough for China to turn away from the Russian leadership, but I do not rule out that the situation may not be so monolithic in the future.
What do you think about the conflict between Ukraine and Poland regarding grain imports? What are its consequences?
I would not like to exaggerate the importance of the situation. Of course, Ukraine is not satisfied that its strategic partner Poland unilaterally decided to violate European principles and bans on the import of agricultural products from Ukraine, but at the unofficial level, everyone understood the real reasons for the actions. Parliamentary elections and the desire of “Law and Justice” to maintain their own positions, not to vote for “Confederation” or “Civic Platform”, which, by the way, concluded a situational alliance with “Agrounia” – these factors are at the basis of the protectionist policy of the Polish leadership.
Despite everything, grain should not become the cause of a real and acute conflict between countries. There are opportunities to find a compromise solution after October 15, when the elections will be held in Poland. I think that in any case, the Polish side will be interested in maintaining restrictions on imports, but in return they can offer options for expanding transit opportunities, access to Poland’s port infrastructure, etc.
They hope that the topic of grain will take a back seat and the basis of the dialogue will remain issues of security cooperation, military-technical support. Ukraine may receive more than one hundred tanks as a result of the modernization program of the Polish army. Against the background of the importance of strategic interaction, such politicized issues as the import of grain simply need to be resolved without unnecessary noise.
It is important how quickly Poland will be able to stabilize the situation following the election results, when a majority and a government will be formed, so that internal political circumstances do not delay effective Polish-Ukrainian interaction.