Peculiarities of the Security Agreement between Ukraine and Poland
Editorial article of the East European Council
The security agreement with the Republic of Poland is of particular importance for Ukraine, since the Polish political leadership is more aware than others of the risks of Russian aggression and is most interested in the complete victory of the Ukrainian armed forces in the war.
The concept of “a strong Ukraine is a safe Poland” is not an empty statement, and among the Polish political establishment and ordinary citizens there is a majority understanding that Poland is in a special risk zone if Ukraine cannot overcome Russian military expansion.
That is why the expectations from the Polish-Ukrainian agreements were extremely ambitious, and it can be concluded that in many respects they have been justified.
The provisions concerning the agreement of the parties to work on the development and lobbying at the NATO level of mechanisms that would allow the Polish military to hit air targets heading towards the territory of Poland seem quite bold.
This point is unprecedented and qualitatively distinguishes the Polish-Ukrainian document from others.
It is clear that the joint intention does not mean that tomorrow Polish air defense will shoot down missiles or drones over the airspace of Lviv or Volyn region, but this is the first and cautious step in the indicated direction. This was already confirmed by the Minister of Defense Vladyslav Kosinyak-Kamysh. Despite this, once upon a time, Ukraine could not even dream of an F-16, therefore, small steps should be taken here to achieve strategic goals.
Donald Tusk has already become the object of speculation in the domestic political arena, when representatives of the “Confederation” began to criticize him for the agreement with Ukraine.
However, the Polish Prime Minister clearly articulated that the clause on the “partial closure of the Ukrainian sky” will be discussed at the NATO level and only with the Alliance’s consent can it be transformed into practical solutions or actions.
It is important for Ukraine that Polish partners not only do not rule out such a scenario, but also help with its positioning.
Another fundamentally important provision is that Poland clearly and unconditionally supports the Peace Formulas of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and the Ukrainian vision of a just end to the war. All other initiatives, such as Viktor Orbán’s “peace tourism” without the EU mandate or parallel models of a temporary “war freeze” are dangerous and will not bring results.
There is also an optimistic point about further work on Ukraine’s acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft from the balance of the Polish armed forces. In general, the Polish side is able to provide additional fighter jets to Ukraine, but on the condition that they be replaced by others from partners.
The approach of official Warsaw is based on the fact that in the conditions of the neighborhood with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, Poland cannot allow the weakening of its own air security. As soon as the Polish armed forces receive new aircraft or the fighter jets of the Alliance partner countries provide protection of Polish skies, Donald Tusk will have “free hands” to form another powerful support package for Ukraine.
The point about the formation of a foreign legion by Poland, which will be open to Ukrainian citizens living abroad, seems interesting and unexpected. They will be able to undergo the necessary training, be equipped and sign contracts with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
Basically, such an idea should allay the fears of Ukrainian citizens who fear that they will be sent to war without proper training or that they will not be able to return to Poland after the end of their military service. How effective is this idea? Only time will tell. However, there are no objections to its innovativeness and non-standard nature.
In general, other provisions of the large-scale and complex document have a lot in common with the predecessors signed with other partners of Ukraine: security, humanitarian and political support, the movement of Ukraine into the EU and NATO, the end of the war based on the principle of territorial integrity, the strategic importance of bilateral partnership, etc. d.
Among others, the proposals of the economic bloc have a constructive value. First of all, the idea of official Warsaw to provide Ukraine with free electricity based on coal generation.
What is in its content?
Poland has a fairly large number of thermal power plants, which are actually not involved due to the high tax on electricity generation from coal. The existing infrastructure and capabilities will allow Poland to generate and send free electricity to Ukraine already this year, provided that the EU finances the organizational costs and exempts Poland from the tax. The last requirement is the most difficult, as it requires the consent of all EU members, which means that Ukraine and Poland will have to act actively and with a common front, if the presented idea is of interest to the Ukrainian side, which is forced to overcome the consequences of the terror organized by Russian troops against the civilian population.
To summarize: the bilateral agreement is quite powerful and covers all areas of bilateral relations. In general, it can form the basis of a new model of Polish-Ukrainian relations, which will be based on predictability, pragmatism, objectivity and will not depend on the situational political situation, as it often happened before.