Revision of relations between Ukraine and Poland. Part I: the 2027 parliamentary elections and their possible consequences

Director of the Eastern European Council Anton Naychuk
East European Council > UAPL COUNCIL > Analytics > Revision of relations between Ukraine and Poland. Part I: the 2027 parliamentary elections and their possible consequences

At first glance, the elections in Hungary have somewhat improved the situation for Ukrainian interests in the so-called Visegrad Four. Of course, one should not overestimate the position of the new Hungarian government towards Ukraine, since it will continue to be based solely on its own national interests, which will sometimes conflict with Ukrainian expectations.

If we take into account the specific relations with Slovakia and the complex political configurations in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Poland has traditionally remained a stable partner.

However, is it right to think that relations between Ukraine and Poland will develop only in a constructive direction?

We are starting a series of publications where we will try to analyze all aspects. Let’s start with the 2027 parliamentary elections.

Despite President Karol Nawrocki’s initiatives to change the constitution, in its current form, key powers remain with the government. That is why next year’s parliamentary elections, the formation of a coalition and the appointment of a government will be crucial for Polish politics in the future.

Although the elections are more than a year away, general trends can be formed now.

First, the “Civil Coalition” consistently holds the lead in opinion polls. Its support level is in the range of 30 to 35%.

However, a potential victory does not guarantee its fixation. Why? For the simple reason that partners are needed to form a majority. Of the current coalition, only the Left demonstrates convincing indicators that could allow it to pass the threshold with an estimated result of 6-8%.

The prospects for “2050” are illusory. Especially against the background of the further fragmentation of political power due to internal conflicts.

The PSL remains, but no sociological poll has yet given them the desired 5%. The party is certainly determined that the selection of strong candidates for majoritarian districts will be able to correct the situation, but there are no guarantees of passage yet.

Without the passage of the indicated parties into the Sejm, it will be difficult for the Civic Coalition to count on gaining power. They will risk repeating the PiS scenario of 2023, when first place was not a victory.

Theoretically, there will be a possibility of reaching an agreement with part of the Confederation, but it is quite difficult and premature to model such a scenario now.

Secondly, there is an active struggle on the right flank, which has long violated the unspoken principle – there is only a wall to the right of the PiS.

First, the Confederation showed its ambitions in the presidential elections, and now it claims 11-15%, depending on the circumstances. Although there are two somewhat rival wings within the political force – Sławomir Mentzen and Krzysztof Bosak – without radical problems and ruptures, they can claim a high result, which will allow them to dictate the conditions for negotiations on the coalition.

However, the biggest problem for Ukrainian national interests is the “Confederation of the Polish Crown” led by Grzegorz Braun.

The political force is notable for its marginal rhetoric regarding Ukraine and its ability to cross any “red lines”. They do not claim victory, but the expected result within 6-9% will provide them with a “golden share” in the formation of a coalition of right-wing forces. Without them, it is practically impossible.

Although, due to the anti-Semitic rhetoric of the party representatives, they are particularly critically perceived by the US Ambassador to Poland, and the leader of the PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, spoke about the impossibility of an alliance with Grzegorz Braun – but the situation may push them to another path.

Of course, one can fantasize about PiS’s attempts to drag PSL into its own alliance, but Władysław Kosyniak-Kamyś’s party has yet to enter parliament, and its leader is demonstrating in every way his determination to maintain the alliance with Donald Tusk for a longer period, if the situation allows.

Therefore, the scenario of revenge by the right-wing forces with the inclusion of the Confederation of the Polish Crown in the majority is the most dangerous option for Ukraine, precisely because of the risks of Grzegorz Braun’s presence.

However, so far this scenario – which seemed inevitable after last year’s presidential elections – faces many problematic aspects.

Of course, one can fantasize about PiS’s attempts to drag PSL into its own alliance, but Władysław Kosyniak-Kamyś’s party has yet to enter parliament, and its leader is demonstrating in every way his determination to preserve the alliance with Donald Tusk for a longer period, if the situation allows.

Therefore, the scenario of revenge by the right-wing forces with the inclusion of the Confederation of the Polish Crown in the majority is the most dangerous option for Ukraine, precisely because of the risks of Grzegorz Braun’s presence.

However, for now, this scenario – which seemed inevitable after last year’s presidential elections – faces many problematic aspects.

One of them is within PiS itself. Internal competition in the political force between the group of the candidate for prime minister, Przemysław Czarnek, and the group of former prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, is gaining momentum. The latter seeks to play an important role, but his presence will complicate coalition negotiations with the “Confederation”, where politicians are despised.

The question remains open: will Jarosław Kaczyński manage to show political genius and unite voters of a more radical direct orientation (Czarnek’s audience) and moderate centrists (Morawiecski’s audience)?

The answer to this question will be crucial for the implementation of the right-wing coalition scenario.

So far, sociology has recorded a further political split within Poland, which does not allow us to determine the most likely scenario for the development of events during the parliamentary campaign, and therefore does not provide a final understanding of the composition of the future coalition.