The attitude of key Polish political forces towards Ukraine and what will determine further relations

The topic of Ukraine will occupy a strategic place in both Poland’s foreign and domestic policies with different dynamics. In any case: it is extremely important for Ukrainian diplomacy to develop a correct understanding of the situation and build an effective paradigm of relations that does not depend on tactical interests or situational benefits, but is aimed at a long-term mutually beneficial basis. At the same time, for a better understanding of Poland, it is worth being aware of the positioning of each political force that claims to enter the new composition of the parliament based on the results of 2027.

“Law and Justice”: from cooperation to confrontation

The key argument in favor of the above thesis is the political evolution of “Law and Justice”, which is quite indicative today.

Before the start of the full-scale invasion, bilateral relations with Poland had enough unresolved problems of various origins – not only in the historical plane. However, it was in the winter of 2022 that the then government headed by Mateusz Morawiecki and party leader Jarosław Kaczyński took a huge step towards supporting Ukraine.

In addition to bright political gestures with the arrival in Kyiv, the Polish side provided the maximum amount of military support, which significantly strengthened the defense capabilities of the Ukrainian army and helped it survive in the first months of the war, while the largest countries in the EU and the USA were in no hurry with fundamental steps.

It would seem that the plot of Polish-Ukrainian relations was moving towards strategic rapprochement, but optimistic expectations did not justify themselves.

There was an escalation in the export of Ukrainian agricultural products through the territory of Poland, which caused a political conflict and a blockade of the borders. The constructive position of PiS towards Ukraine has somewhat faltered, although before that the Polish Minister of Agriculture even supported the import of Ukrainian grain and did not see any risks in it.

The excellent interpersonal relations between the presidents of both countries did not save the situation.

At first, the tragic incident in the town of Przewodów had a negative impact.

Then there was a tough exchange of declarations at the UN General Assembly and a gradual loss of positive momentum in relations.

In 2023, PiS lost power, went into opposition, and still took a fairly moderate position towards Ukraine until then.

A new stage in the transformation of the party’s political approaches was the summer of 2026, when PiS’s candidate for prime minister, Przemysław Czarnek, called for blocking Ukraine’s accession to the EU under the pretext of “glorifying the UPA”.

The party’s policy towards Ukraine has probably reached a critical point for us, as even quite centrist representatives of the political force – like Mateusz Morawiecki – are trying to act in the mainstream.

What are the reasons for today’s actions?

Firstly, PiS is concerned that to their right is not a “wall”, which determined the previous long-term dominance of the party, but two “Confederations” have appeared.

Secondly, sociology gives a fairly clear trend – the revenge of the right-wing forces in 2027 is possible, but the formation of a majority without the participation of Grzegorz Braun’s “Confederation of the Polish Crown” is not.

However, such a partner is extremely toxic for Jarosław Kaczyński. Even US political and diplomatic circles are critical of such a format of the union, which puts PiS in a dilemma: either return power at any cost or follow the recommendations of strategically important American partners.

So far, PiS has chosen the approach of “knocking down” the ratings of the “Confederation of the Polish Crown” and returning some of their voters to itself.

In the ideal scenario for PiS, it would be to win first place in the elections and for the Confederation of the Polish Crown to finish outside the threshold. Then Jarosław Kaczyński’s party would only claim an alliance with the Confederation, the mediation in the creation of which could be provided by a formally non-partisan president.

The above strategy also led to the radicalization of PiS towards Ukraine and Przemysław Czarnek’s harsh attacks. The latter faces the task of returning right-wing voters to PiS, which has not yet been successfully resolved.

“Confederation”: Polish modification of MAGA

It is easy for representatives of a political force to be consistent in their policy towards Ukraine. Unlike PiS, they did not change their approaches and did not transfer military equipment for the needs of Ukraine. It is not surprising that the leaders of the “Confederation” Krzysztof Bosak and Sławomir Mentzen call for the suspension of aid to Ukraine or for the condition of strict promotion of Polish interests in exchange for support or a logistical function for Poland.

It is difficult to expect that the “Confederation”’s approaches to Ukraine will undergo radical changes.

Even a theoretical revenge of the right-wing forces is inevitable without the participation of the specified political force in the formation of the majority and the government, on which they place special hopes.

“The Confederation of the Polish Crown”: an outpost of anti-Ukrainian politics

The dangerous trend is not only the presence of such a political force in Poland, but also an even greater risk – they manage to set trends in the fight for the right-wing voter. Even the initiative on the need to revoke the Order of the “White Eagle” from the President of Ukraine primarily arose in the information field from speakers close to the “Confederation of the Polish Crown”. For example, the former Prime Minister of Poland Leszek Miller, who after the end of his own term was “inspired” by the atmosphere of the “Valdai Forum”.

Of course, in the situation with the order, there is no need to look for any parallels or conspiracy theories, the office of the President of Poland definitely does not listen to the “advice” of such odious personalities.

The problem is that they can set trends in the discourse of right-wing forces, which in the future may have an indirect influence on further decisions.

The passage of the specified political force into parliament will create a systemic problem and in the interests of Ukraine, so that it does not in any way participate in the formation of the majority.

“Civil Coalition”: Predicted Pragmatism

In this situation, a difficult situation has arisen for Prime Minister Donald Tusk. On the one hand, he is interested in expanding the strategic partnership with Ukraine in the economic and security sphere, on the other hand, he is under systemic pressure from opposition forces for “excessive pro-Ukrainian policy”.

For objectivity, it is worth noting: although the historical topic is deliberately used for politicization, the topic of the Volyn tragedy is extremely sensitive for Polish society as a whole. No political force will ignore this circumstance.

That is why the Polish government is most interested in de-escalating and depoliticizing historical politics. However, they will also reinsure themselves and will be critical of the topic of the UPA as a whole, only separating it from security and the economy.

Donald Tusk and Radosław Sikorski clearly realize that only the Russian Federation will benefit from the escalation of the confrontation between Ukraine and Poland, and they do not hide the strategic interest of official Warsaw in supporting Ukraine in deterring Russian aggression.

Of course, such a policy is not a manifestation of “sacrifice” or a “charity act”. It primarily meets the pragmatic interests of Poland – Polish diplomacy remembers the Russian demands to review the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, which preceded the military invasion of Ukraine. Warsaw is definitely not interested in Russian troops creating a bridgehead on Ukrainian territory.

The Polish government also understands the process of Ukraine’s European integration, so that it does not become a cause of confrontation, but contributes to the strengthening of official Warsaw as a reliable ally in the EU.

Of course, achieving such a balance and synergy is difficult, but Donald Tusk’s team is looking for opportunities to achieve it – primarily – through economic cooperation and greater involvement of Polish companies and logistics in the reconstruction of Ukraine.

The government’s policy is pragmatic, but predictable. They seek to maintain consistency and not question the course in support of Ukraine, but expect to receive economic results from interaction that can be presented within Poland, as well as to defend their own interests in other areas – such as agricultural policy.

Of course, such an approach will not allow avoiding disagreements and problematic issues. However, international relations are not ideal. From a practical point of view, the Polish government is interested in preserving and expanding the “window of opportunity” in relations with Ukraine.

The point is that the right steps are needed from both sides. The Polish government needs to act more decisively and not succumb to pressure from the opposition forces, to demonstrate subjectivity, which will allow to ensure active participation in the negotiation process around Ukraine.

The Ukrainian side needs to build a pragmatic economic policy beneficial to all parties, which will not consist in “sorting allies by status”. For security support and European integration, consolidated actions of all partners are important. The key is not to succumb to emotions and not to follow the path of escalation, taking into account all the peculiarities of the political process inside Poland.

“Left”: stability and consistency

In the ranks of the political forces, they are interested in the de-escalation of the whole situation and are politically oriented on much different issues. Moreover, the Speaker of the Diet and the leader of the political forces, Vladimej Chazhasty, would like to be the leader of constructive communication with Ukraine, if the appropriate approach is supported in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

“Livytsia” maintains a convincing position to enter the Diet and is ready to act as an ally for the “Civic Coalition”, but the “golden share” in the allocation of seats will depend on others.

“PSL”: between past and future

Vice-Prime Minister, Minister of Defense Vladyslav Kosyniak-Kamysh has excellent positions in the current composition of the government, but he has two problematic issues: the first is the need to take into account the importance of historical politics for the traditional electorate of the political force, and the second is the lack of clear guarantees regarding the political future.

After the collapse of “Tretya dorogya”, Vladyslav Kosyniak-Kamysh will have to look for the right formula to overcome the 5% barrier in the upcoming elections. In the worst case, he risks not only being out of government, but also losing the leadership of the party.

It is critically important for the “Civic Coalition” to preserve the “PSL” in the Diet. In the current configurations, when the support of the allied political force is less than 5%, Donald Tusk’s political force risks repeating the path of its key opponents from PiS in 2023 – victory without a majority.

That is why Vladyslav Kosyniak-Kamysh is trying to simultaneously demonstrate solidarity in the government with the line of support for Ukraine, but to set strict frameworks for the transfer of Soviet aircraft without Polish costs for their modernization to Ukrainian needs. Make calls for the de-escalation of historical issues, organizing a visit to Lutsk, but not emphasizing the inadmissibility of Ukraine joining the EU with the “glorification of the UPA”.

The construction of the future coalition may depend on whether the PSL will pass the parliament – either the extension of the existing majority with minor changes or the opening of the way to the revenge of the right-wing forces.

Taking into account all the political vicissitudes in Poland, we are forced to think about the strategic concept of future relations – predictable and pragmatic.

If there are opinions on the part of Poland about the intentions of official Warsaw to form relations based on mutual interest, where Polish interests will take the leading place, it is expedient for Ukraine to act in a similar way.

The position of the Russian Federation proves that the issue of peace is not yet in the Kremlin, and hostilities will continue for an undetermined period of time. At this distance, we need reliable allies who share our vision of the situation and are aware of the real level of threat, are ready to maintain long-term economic pressure on the aggressor country, contribute to the maintenance of the pro-Ukrainian coalition within the EU and NATO on a long-term basis, and will lobby for further decisions regarding financial support. In this context, Poland is of great interest to Ukraine.

However, it should also be understood in Warsaw that the strengthening of Ukraine’s position in the international arena is not aimed at relegating Poland to the periphery or other conspiratorial goals, which are spread in some places by separate expert circles.

It is in the interests of Poland to have a reliable security and economic format of interaction with Ukraine on parity terms, where the subjectivity of each of the parties will not stand in the way of common goals.