Transnistria: prospects for reintegration or threats of escalation
International expert Ernest Vardanean for East European Council
The armed invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022 caused great difficulties for the unrecognized Transnistria, which is an internationally recognized part of the Republic of Moldova.
There have also been very serious and currently insurmountable obstacles to achieving a sustainable political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, due to the fact that the Russian Federation and Ukraine are guarantor and mediator countries, in accordance with the Agreement on Peacekeeping and Security Guarantees between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria dated July 5, 1995.
The closure by Ukraine of all checkpoints on the Transnistrian section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border (February 28, 2022) led to a complete rupture of the railway and road links between Ukraine and the Transnistrian region. As a result of the outbreak of war, the flow of goods from Odessa and other regions of Ukraine to Moldova was sharply reduced, and the closure of the Transnistrian section of the border led to the fact that export-import operations continued through the territory of the Republic of Moldova proper, bypassing Transnistria, and this turned the region from a profitable transit point into traffic jam.
Correspondingly, the influence of the Transnistrian administration as a de facto political player decreased, which during the previous 30 years, with more or less success, depending on the regional situation, maneuvered between Russia and Ukraine, between Ukraine and Moldova, even between Russia and the European Union. It should be noted that the EU continues to be the main market for goods from the region – more than a third of the total. At the same time, only 10% of Transnistrian goods are supplied to the countries of the Eurasian Union, including Russia1.
Since before the war the lion’s share of the flow of goods in and through Transnistria passed through the territory of the Odessa region, or rather, through the ports of Odessa and Chernomorsk, for the Transnistrian administration and large business, represented primarily by the Sheriff group of companies, the position of the leadership of Ukraine as a whole and The Odessa Regional Administration in particular has always been of vital importance.
It is safe to consider the leadership of Transnistria and “Sheriff” more loyal to Ukraine than to Russia, despite the widely publicized slogans about “Transnistria’s choice to be together with Russia.” So, it was established that the head of the Sheriff group of companies, Viktor Gushan, has Ukrainian citizenship and owns luxury estate in Ukraine2. Journalistic investigations have shown that both the “president of Transnistria” Vadim Krasnoselsky3 and other leaders of the Transnistrian administration have Ukrainian passports4. And this is despite the fact that Krasnoselsky, Vitaly Ignatiev, “Foreign Minister of Transnistria” and other persons also have Russian citizenship.
At the same time, there is information that Vadim Krasnoselsky’s wife, Svetlana, has Romanian citizenship5, which looks very curious against the backdrop of many years of propaganda by the Transnistrian authorities on the topic of the “Romanian threat” or “threat of Romanianization”.
On the other hand, the “excessively” close ties between the Tiraspol elite and Kyiv, especially after Vadim Krasnoselsky came to power following the “presidential elections” in December 2016 and was re-elected for a second five-year term in December 2021, aroused Moscow’s fears in “disloyalty” of the Transnistrian leadership6.
In this sense, a good example is the first days after the start of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine. Already on February 26, 2022, Vadim Krasnoselsky made an appeal, commenting on the reports that appeared in the Ukrainian information space about the preparation of some kind of armed provocation from the territory of Transnistria against Ukraine. “We have never had any plans of an aggressive nature towards our neighbors, we never have, and we never will,” the Transnistrian leader said7.
In early March 2022, announcements of a “rally in support of Russia’s actions” appeared in Transnistrian groups on social networks, the organizers of which remained unknown. The Transnistrian leadership, represented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, immediately condemned this action and called its organizers provocateurs. The rally nevertheless took place, but with the participation of a small number of citizens and was not covered in the local media.
The Tiraspol leadership rightly regarded this manifestation as an attempt to discredit Transnistria both in the eyes of Russia (given that the local authorities in every possible way prevented the pro-Russian action) and in the eyes of Ukraine, which could regard this as support for Russia’s military aggression. In those days, the Ukrainian media constantly circulated reports about the upcoming “opening of a second front in Transnistria,” so the pro-Russian rally only added fuel to the fire.
Experts are confident that the Tiraspol leadership (de facto, the Sheriff company) managed to keep the situation under control, since they do not need a war, but quite the contrary, they need peace in Ukraine. “Every day Transnistria is ruled by the Sheriff corporation and its two co-owners. They don’t need a war. What they want is peace in Ukraine. Their own piece of the privatized border, well-established trade flows, smuggling, free Russian gas and electricity that they sell to us [the Republic of Moldova],” said former Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Alexandru Flenchia8.
There are other signals that the Sheriff company has chosen the path of non-intervention in the war. My sources in Chisinau, who are trustworthy, told me that in 2022, a meeting was held on the territory of Romania between the President of the Sheriff group of companies, Victor Gushan, and representatives of Western governments (names and countries were not named). At this meeting, Mr. Gushan gave assurances that the leadership of the unrecognized Transnistria would not, under any circumstances and in any form, allow the participation of the region’s security forces, as well as the Russian contingent, in military operations or other actions of a forceful nature against Ukraine on the side of Russia.
My sources also said that Viktor Gushan is paying monthly additional “money allowance” to the commander of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria, Colonel Dmitry Zelenkov, as a financial guarantee that Russian troops stationed in the Transnistrian region will not participate in any actions against Ukraine9.
Speaking about security issues in the Transnistrian region, it is necessary to highlight in detail the incident that occurred on April 25, 2022 in Tiraspol. On that day, three unidentified persons drove up in a car to the building of the “Ministry of State Security” in the center of the city, each pulled out a hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher (RPG) and fired a shot from a distance of about 40-50 meters, after which they immediately disappeared. The most powerful was the third shot, which knocked out the entrance door to the MSS building and the windows on the upper floors. In addition, windows in nearby residential buildings were shattered by the blast. No one was hurt in the incident.
This incident raised many questions. I immediately drew attention to the fact that it took place on April 25, on Monday, the day after Orthodox Easter, when not a single state institution, not a single educational institution, and even some shops are open. The malefactors could not help knowing this, since they decided to choose the “MSS” as a target. Thus, they fired at an empty building – then the question arises about the purpose of the attack: to sow panic, cause chaos, carry out an act of intimidation?
The next day, on April 26, 2022, a new incident occurred: in the village of Mayak, Grigoriopol region, the Transnistrian radio and television center (Mayak) was fired upon. According to some reports, it was an attack by drones, according to others – an explosion as a result of a sabotage attack. After two incidents, the Transnistrian authorities introduced a “red level of terrorist threat”, transferred all educational institutions to online mode, canceled festive events scheduled for May 9, and set up checkpoints at the entrance to all cities of the Left Bank. By the way, the “red level” is still preserved.
A very important aspect is the extremely contradictory reactions of the Transnistrian administration, the leadership of Moldova, the General Staff of Ukraine and the Russian Foreign Ministry. Tiraspol blamed some “sabotage group” that arrived from the territory of Ukraine, but did not directly point to the political or military leadership of Ukraine as the customer or beneficiary of this attack. Moldovan President Maia Sandu said that the attacks were organized by “forces within the region”, that is, she did not point to any external forces. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine noted that Russia could resort to provocations in Transnistria in order to blame Ukraine for this, while the Russian Foreign Ministry did not comment on the incident itself, emphasizing only that Russia respects the territorial integrity of Moldova and stands only for a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict10.
Based on the analysis of open information, as well as on the basis of my conversations with sources in the diplomatic corps in Chisinau, I came to the conclusion that the reaction of the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, is closest to the truth. Her words about some “forces within the region” describe the situation more accurately, namely: pro-Russian groups in Transnistria, whose state and especially security structures are riddled with Russian agents, decided to organize a sabotage attack in order to cast a shadow on Ukraine.
Anyone who lives or has lived in Tiraspol (including the author of these lines) knows perfectly well that it is impossible to approach or drive up to the MSS building without being noticed. The center of the city, all exits from it are hung with surveillance cameras, and the section of the border with Ukraine, as we already know, was closed on February 28. How could saboteurs disappear without a trace from the small territory of Transnistria? If they are allegedly from Ukraine, then where and how could they hide? If in the direction of Chisinau, then they would immediately be detained by the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Moldova, since there is interaction between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the two banks in matters of catching and extraditing criminals.
This means that the saboteurs could “lay low” only in Transnistria itself, and if they have not yet been found (at the moment there is no information about this), then we can confidently say that they are under the auspices of the Transnistrian security forces, where, as I already noted, full of Russian agents. The logical question of why Tiraspol did not complete the investigation of the incidents, but preferred to hide the ends in the water, should be answered, given the military-political situation in the spring-summer of 2022:
– the Russian army was still strong,
– Russia then still controlled Kherson – the nearest to Transnistria large city of Ukraine under occupation;
– regular rocket attacks on the entire territory of Ukraine continued.
Therefore, Tiraspol could not and did not want to publish the results of the investigation, which could lead to the Russian trail. In addition, the appearance of officially confirmed information about the involvement of Russia or pro-Russian forces in the incidents in Tiraspol and Mayak would have caused condemnation from Moldova, Ukraine and Western countries. Therefore, in this situation, both the Transnistrian administration and the official leadership in Chisinau preferred to remain silent in order to prevent an escalation, the purpose of which was the incidents.
In this context, we must recall the scandalous statement of the Deputy Commander of the Central Military District of Russia, Major General Rustam Minnekayev. On April 22, he said that control over the south of Ukraine would give Russian troops “one more outlet to Transnistria, where there are facts of oppression of the Russian-speaking population.”11 These words are not so much scandalous as absurd, since the “oppression of the Russian-speaking population” in Russian-speaking Transnistria is nonsense.
Nevertheless, the general’s demarche provoked a strong reaction in Chisinau. Thus, the Bureau for Reintegration in the Government of the Republic of Moldova called the statement “unacceptable and unfounded”, as well as leading to “growth of tension and distrust in society”12. The Ambassador of the Russian Federation, Oleg Vasnetsov, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, to whom “deep concern was expressed about the statements made by the Russian official”13. Characteristically, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not either confirm or deny General Minnekaev, saying “We still do not comment on issues related to the (special operation)”, although usually in Moscow they react very nervously to any kind of reports. and statements if they do not comply with its policies.
At this stage, I do not see any prospects for resuming the negotiation process for a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The main reason is, of course, the aggression of the Russian Federation (one formal guarantor of the settlement in Transnistria) against Ukraine (another formal guarantor), which makes their interaction absolutely unrealistic.
At the same time, the US and the European Union, which in 2005 received the formal status of observers in the negotiation process, but actually have a much greater influence on the process, do not reject interaction with Russia on the Transnistrian issue. In the same way, the United States and France do not reject dialogue with Russia on the Karabakh issue within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, while Russia itself at the Foreign Ministry level has repeatedly, but unreasonably stated that the United States and France “in the heat of Russophobia refused to have a dialogue with Russia”, that American and French diplomats refuted.
Thus, the 5 + 2 negotiation format can be considered non-working today14.
At the same time, one cannot discount the probability of reaching a certain agreement between the parties (Chisinau and Tiraspol) with guarantees from Ukraine, the EU and the USA. Using the OSCE as a traditional negotiating platform in this situation is not a particularly realistic scenario, given the veto power that Russia, like any other OSCE member state, can use to block processes that are unfavorable to itself.
Therefore, the only way to achieve any acceptable formula for resolving the Transnistrian issue is to organize, under the auspices of Western countries, a constructive, confidential and open dialogue between the official leadership of the Republic of Moldova and the Tiraspol administration with the participation of the head of the Sheriff group of companies, which is one way or another true, but shadow leader of the Transnistrian region. The fact that Viktor Gushan has reached the aforementioned agreement with Western countries and stability has been maintained in Transnistria for already a year is quite convincing evidence that the shadow leader of the region, in the presence of trusting relationships and reliable guarantees, can ensure at least a stable dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
The two main risk factors for such negotiations are:
- Sheriff’s material and financial assets located in Transnistria or “tied” to the region are both weighty and controversial in terms of checking for “gray schemes” in accordance with international standards and norms. According to experts dealing with the Transnistrian issue, Sheriff’s business can flourish only in the conditions of the “gray zone”, that is, in the absence of direct control from the national legislation of the Republic of Moldova and international law. Accordingly, the reintegration of Transnistria into the Republic of Moldova will put an end to the “gray zone” and undermine the basis of Sheriff’s business. Based on this, it can be assumed that the company is not particularly interested in settling the Transnistrian issue. But this is only at first glance. Firstly, the regional situation and, in particular, the probable military defeat of Russia in Ukraine may lead to its complete withdrawal from Transnistria and the reformatting of the settlement process itself. In other words, if there is no Russia over Transnistria, then the main obstacle to settlement will also disappear, so Sheriff will simply have no choice. Secondly, the Sheriff group of companies has assets in the EU countries – in particular, in Germany15, and we are talking only about what was described in the press – at the moment there is no complete information about the company’s assets in Western countries. Accordingly, the “price of the issue” in future negotiations under the auspices of the West could be the preservation of the firm’s assets in European countries.
- Russian opposition. Even under the condition of Russia’s military defeat in Ukraine and/or its withdrawal from the Transnistrian region, one cannot underestimate the degree of its influence, including through the press, loyal politicians, public organizations. In addition, the legislative and governance systems in Transnistria are “harmonized” with Russia; educational institutions work on programs similar to those in Russia, and with its support. The Transnistrian region continues to receive de facto free Russian gas, and pensioners receive a pension supplement from Russia16. Finally, according to various sources, from 180 to 260 thousand Russian citizens live in the region, and it is their “protection from the Nazis” that can become the same pretext for intervention, as in the case of Ukraine, the “protection of the Russian people, the Russian world” became the pretext.
Stopping the risks of subversive activities on the part of Russia is the business of professionals in this area, and as for the gas and socio-economic component, the Western countries can provide the population of Transnistria (the actual number of people living there does not exceed 300 thousand) and alternative sources of energy, and compensation for those financial flows that have so far been provided by Russia.
This gesture on the part of Western countries, in addition to a purely humanitarian nature, will also be of a pragmatic nature: not to give Russia any reason to accuse the leadership of Moldova, Ukraine and Western countries of “oppression of the Russian-speaking population”, of “violating the rights of Russian citizens”, etc.
The main success factor of the above settlement option is to prevent Russian intervention, and for this, in turn, it is necessary to replace it in the role of the main socio-economic and energy guarantor of the population of the Transnistrian region.
REFERENCES:
[1] Показатели приднестровского экспорта в 2021 году – рекордные за последние 20 лет.
2 RFERL: У олигарха из Приднестровья нашелся паспорт Украины и дорогая недвижимость под Киевом. https://www.unian.net/politics/10887437-rferl-u-oligarha-iz-pridnestrovya-nashelsya-pasport-ukrainy-i-dorogaya-nedvizhimost-pod-kievom.html
3 Украинский «билет» в Европу лидеров зоны российской оккупации (ссылка)
4 Украинские паспорта начальников российской «зоны» (ссылка)
5 Жена так называемого президента ПМР Светлана Красносельская получила румынское гражданство. https://nokta.md/zhena-tak-nazyvaemogo-prezidenta-pmr-svetlana-krasnoselskaya-poluchila-rumynskoe-grazhdanstvo/
6 «Республика Шериф»-21. Кремль меняет ставки в Приднестровье. https://ava.md/2020/08/25/respublika-sherif-21-kreml-menyaet-stavki/
7 Президент ПМР призвал жителей Украины не верить недостоверной информации о некоей угрозе со стороны Приднестровья. https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/22-02-26/prezident-pmr-prizval-zhiteley-ukrainy-ne-verit-nedostovernoy
8 «Шерифу» война не нужна? Что будет с Приднестровьем после вторжения России в Украину. https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/sherifu-vojna-ne-nuzhna-chto-proiskhodit-s-pridnestrovem-posle-vtorzheniya-rossii-v-ukrainu/
9 Опубликовано видео с моментом нападения на здание “МГБ” в Тирасполе. Неизвестные произвели три выстрела из гранатометов. https://tv8.md/ru/2022/27/04/opublikovano-video-s-momentom-napadeniya-na-zdanie-mgb-v-tiraspole-neizvestnie-proizveli-tri-vistrela-iz-granatometov/199109
10 Приднестровье втягивают в боевые действия на Украине? Что об этом известно. https://rtvi.com/news/pridnestrove-vtyagivayut-v-boevye-deystviya-na-ukraine-chto-ob-etom-izvestno/
11 Замкомандующего войсками ЦВО назвал цели второго этапа военной операции на Украине. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5318738
12 В Молдове отреагировали на заявления РФ о намерениях получить «выход» к Приднестровью. https://charter97.org/ru/news/2022/4/22/464640/
13 Посла России в Кишинёве снова вызвали в МИДЕИ после высказываний российского генерала о создании коридора в Приднестровье. https://trm.md/ru/politika/rossijskogo-posla-v-kisineve-snova-vyzvali-v-midei-posle-zaavlenij-rossijskogo-generala-o-sozdanii-koridora-v-pridnestrov-e
14 Молдова и Приднестровье – стороны переговоров, Россия и Украина – гаранты и посредники, ОБСЕ – посредник и главная переговорная площадка, ЕС и США – наблюдатели.
15 Реклама для неонацистов. https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/119403
16 По поручению Президента ПМР выплата российской надбавки к пенсии начнется уже в ноябре. https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/22-11-22/po-porucheniyu-prezidenta-pmr-vyplata-rossiyskoy-nadbavki-k-pensii