What are the conclusions from the results of the presidential elections and referendum in Moldova?

The first round of the presidential elections and the referendum on the election of the European Movement of Moldova did not meet the optimistic expectations of Maia Sandu’s team. The voting results demonstrate the polarization of the Moldovan population and significant risks of a revanche of pro-Russian forces in the parliamentary campaign of 2025.

Prevention of dangerous scenarios requires detailed conclusions and adjustments to the approaches of the international community to Moldova’s policy. If the vote on October 20 became an “alarm bell” and victory in the second round will require significant efforts from Maia Sandu, then the parliamentary elections threaten to become a strategic defeat with the subsequent formation of a pro-Russian coalition.

Moldova’s accession to the EU was supported by 50.42% of the population in the referendum, which allowed it to win, but does not demonstrate the real level of support for European integration, which is much higher. However, the political miscalculations of the authorities have significantly complicated the situation and have given rise to speculation by pro-Russian forces.

What important conclusions should be made:

1) Maia Sandu’s domestic policy has weakened her position within the country and increased the level of disappointment within the diaspora, which is the foundation for supporting pro-European forces and maintaining a pro-European foreign policy.

The high level of the incumbent President’s negative rating could have played a destructive role in the referendum results, as it partially affected the decrease in the number of supporters of integration into the EU. The politicization of this issue did not allow for the representation of the real number of citizens who support the EU, and their number may indeed be in the range of 55-60%.

If Maia Sandu manages to retain her victory in the second round, she will have to improve communication with the population and take measures to correct the situation. Otherwise, if the consolidation of her opponents in the presidential elections is fraught with defeat in the second round, then the unification of opponents (even despite the potential victory of “PAS”) in the parliamentary elections will lead to the formation of an alternative coalition that will record the final change in the political configurations in the country and will correspond to the interests of Russia; 2) The attempt to monopolize the pro-European electorate limits the scope for political maneuvers and expansion of the circle of followers of the European course. There are at least 100,000 more people who support rapprochement with the EU than those who vote for Maia Sandu. In addition, not all supporters of European integration took part in the referendum, since they perceived this vote as a targeted political move by the team of the current President.

The approach to the personification of the European course and the displacement of other political projects creates conditions for a scenario in which even a potential victory of the “PAS” in the parliamentary elections will not allow the formation of a coalition and will open the way for the unification of pro-Russian parties.

Moldova needs to develop parties that can consolidate people who refuse to support Maia Sandu, as well as attract the centrist electorate and conditionally neutral voters to the pro-European camp.

Voters in the conditional central electoral field should not choose between pro-European or pro-Russian political forces, or simply ignore the elections due to the lack of alternative options on the pro-European flank.

Due to the miscalculations of the current government in Moldova, conditions have been artificially created in which the opposition can express its discontent only by supporting political forces loyal to Russia or by refusing to vote.

There is a growing need to create political projects that will not question European integration, but will offer different approaches to social policy, economics, etc. The political landscape should be based on pluralism of pro-European forces, and an influential politician, a contender in the presidential elections of the next cycle, should appear in their competition;

3) Russia retains the ability to influence the political situation in Moldova. They can count on both truly ideologically minded voters and illegal “networks” that are effectively managed by the pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor.

Although the authorities took measures to limit pro-Russian information propaganda and contain illegal mechanisms of manipulation, they did not justify themselves.

The results show that it was advisable to act not only because of the ban (which is extremely difficult in the conditions of open information space), but because of more active positioning of the European idea, more effective communication on the ground and demonstration of the real reasons for the lack of alternative to the movement to the EU.

The population should realize that European integration is not just an item on the program of one of the political forces, but a national idea underlying state policy.

There is an urgent need for comprehensive information work, because the majority of the Moldovan population does not even realize that economic ties with Russia (even in Gagauzia) have dropped to particularly low levels and the economy has long been reformatted in the EU.

In the absence of progressive solutions in the government’s information policy, pro-Russian forces have retained the tools to promote their own narratives.

Countering such risks requires not a conflict within the ranks of pro-European forces, but their constructive competition with the ability to unite at the right moment.

If the political confrontation in Moldova is not conducted on the platform of pro-European forces, but for the choice of an external vector of movement between the EU and Russia, the European integration of the country will always be under threat;

Statically, more regions of the country voted against the EU: the electorate, dissatisfied with the policy of Maia Sandu, was better mobilized during the referendum. The situation needs to be corrected and a clear demonstration of the prospects for economic cooperation with the EU is needed. Chisinau, where EU supporters have reached 55% and there are prospects for further growth of this result, can serve as an indicative business card;

4) The movement towards the EU must be supported by a successful economic policy and be tangible for all segments of the population. Otherwise, the population will be inclined to populist ideas spread by pro-Russian parties. They will receive additional opportunities to manipulate citizens and reduce the attractiveness of European prospects. For certain segments of the population, the election results have become a form of protest against the miscalculations in Moldova’s domestic economic policy.

In such conditions, the diaspora once again became the driving force and saved the situation from failure. If it were not for the votes of an estimated 15% of the population abroad, pro-Russian forces would have managed to disrupt the referendum results.

What needs to be done to brighten up the situation?

1) Regardless of the results of the second round of the presidential elections, the parliamentary campaign should be strategically important for the future of Moldova.

The key goal of European diplomacy will be to create conditions for the formation of a pro-European majority, which today seems impossible due to the lack of proposals for the pro-European voter and attempts to personify European integration by one political force.

Conclusions must not only be made, but also their implementation must begin in the next few months.

The right step will be to promote the development of alternative political projects that will not question European integration, but will be able to oppose the PAS election program and create their own proposals.

2) Develop a network of effective communication with representatives of local authorities. Demonstrate to them how to effectively use European investment and grant programs for the development of infrastructure, the well-being of cities and villages. Reach out to the population (especially in the regions) through city administrations, explain the advantages and prospects of the European course. Create an image: supporting pro-European parties in parliamentary elections is fixing the course for economic development and security of Moldova;

3) Promote the “decentralization of the European idea and its political representatives” – stimulate the development of political forces that will not only prevent the outflow of pro-European voters, but will also attract new ones, through activities in the centrist electoral field. They will not allow neutral voters (say, those who previously supported the “Democratic Party”) to “drift” in the direction of pro-Russian forces. At the same time, alternative political forces of the European direction should not play the role of “spoilers” that are clearly associated with “PAS”. They should be subject players that will not oppose the EU rapprochement, but will only oppose themselves to the current government. In fact, it is necessary to form a pro-European opposition in Moldova that can criticize the government, but will remain open to a situational alliance with PAS in order to preserve the pro-European future of Moldova.