Will Ukraine be able to establish contact with the President of Poland?
Communication between the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland has not yet developed at the expected positive pace seen, for example, between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Andrzej Duda.
Despite numerous international visits, Karol Nawrocki has yet to visit Kyiv, emphasizing “the Ukrainian people’s insufficient gratitude to the Poles,” while the head of the International Policy Bureau in his Chancellery stated that the President of Ukraine himself could travel to Warsaw by train.
These circumstances introduce a certain dissonance into the allied understanding of Polish-Ukrainian relations that has developed in recent years.
This is especially true given various subjective factors both within Poland and abroad.
Firstly, there is the rise of negative sentiments toward Ukraine among representatives of right-wing political forces in the competition for votes between the PiS and Confederation parties. Incidentally, Karol Nawrocki makes no secret of his intentions to maintain the support of the “confederates,” which helped him win the second round and is now, consciously or not, shaping certain aspects of his foreign policy.
Secondly, the domestic political situation in other countries bordering Ukraine is less than ideal. The Hungarian government is shaping its electoral strategy around anti-Ukrainian approaches.
Furthermore, Viktor Orbán has decided to go even further and initiate the creation of an entire regional union of Visegrád Group countries, ostensibly intended to protect the countries’ sovereignty from the European Commission’s agricultural or migration policies, but in practice, designed to create even more problems for Ukraine, further the ambitions of the Hungarian Prime Minister, and aid him.
Not to mention the ongoing difficult relationship with Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico and the uncertain situation with the Czech Republic, where Andrej Babiš has assumed power, which could also reduce the level of Ukrainian support.
Even the theoretical risk of Poland being drawn into this “Ukraine skeptics” team poses a strategic threat. This is especially true if communication between the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland fails, and the subsequent Polish parliamentary elections result in a collective victory for the right-wing forces.
In part to minimize such risks, Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak visited Warsaw on November 6, 2025. Although this event went unnoticed by most media, it had significant practical significance.
During the visit, meetings were held with Polish political figures who directly shape the country’s foreign policy. While communication with Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and his Deputy Marcin Bosacki marked another diplomatic milestone in the constructive relationship with the Polish government, this first personal contact gives hope for continued and expanded contact, with the prospect of organizing Karol Nawrocki’s visit to Ukraine.
The very fact that Kyiv has made such a political signal demonstrates a commitment to maintaining good-neighborly relations. Traditionally, Andriy Yermak addresses foreign policy issues that are a priority – such as relations with the United States, long-standing attempts to resolve problematic issues with Hungary, negotiations to end the war, etc.
It remains to be seen that Poland – especially at the level of the Presidential Chancellery – has responded constructively, and we will soon see a visit from Marcin Przydacz himself – first, and then from Karol Nawrocki.
Is there really a prospect of escalation in relations with Warsaw? For now, the risks are quite moderate, and appropriate bilateral decisions can prevent such threats altogether.
It should be recognized that Karol Nawrocki will not act according to his predecessor’s principles on Ukrainian issues. He is more focused on the right wing of the electorate, plans to serve two presidential terms, and places great emphasis on uniting the PiS or Confederation electorate around him.
In this format, we will once again hear statements from Karol Nawrocki that will provoke discontent in Ukraine – about historical justice, gratitude, and the like. His rhetoric will primarily target a domestic Polish audience.
Therefore, it will be necessary to find a balance that will allow for a pragmatic dialogue with the President’s team, focusing on issues where we have the most in common. These include security, energy, and deterrence of Russia.
With constructive dialogue and the creation of an effective communication channel – at least at the level of Marcin Przydacz and Andriy Yermak – the Polish President’s team will be able to see the prospects that developing cooperation with Ukraine will offer. After all, we are no longer the party asking for assistance, but are positioning ourselves as true “security donors,” negotiating on an equal footing. Ukrainian experience and weapons can be effectively applied to the modernization of the Polish army, and Karol Nawrocki, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, will see potential in this. Security is just one area where both presidents can find common ground.
Certainly, the Polish political model gives the government considerable practical decision-making power, and official Kyiv has had a positive experience working with it. Prime Minister Donald Tusk maintains a consistent position in political and diplomatic support for Ukraine, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski positions himself as a true “anti-Russian hawk” in European diplomacy, and Defense Minister Władysław Kosyniak-Kamisz has come to understand the importance of cooperation. The government coalition does not have any strong negative sentiments toward Ukraine; even the agrarian party “PSL,” which traditionally opposes Ukrainian grain and advocates for “historical justice,” demonstrates that its support for its Ukrainian partners should be unquestioned.
Of course, there will remain economic or military-technical issues, where official Kyiv would prefer to see greater initiative on the part of Poland (at a minimum, participation in the American arms procurement program), but the Ukrainian leadership respects Poland’s domestic political circumstances and recognizes that even here, progress will eventually be achieved.
At the same time, despite its constructive relationship with the Government, Ukraine continues to demonstrate its determination to ensure effective cooperation with the President. For the Ukrainian side, the unity of Polish state institutions in their policy toward Ukraine is important. This is the only way we will prevent anyone in Poland from following Viktor Orbán’s path, and Ukraine from being dependent on domestic political circumstances. Despite the existing difficulties, there are still ample grounds for optimism, and both sides must capitalize on them.