With our assistance, an interview with Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, was arranged for Wirtualna Polska

Mykhailo Podolak: Political crisis in Ukraine? This is the price of democracy, which Russia will never understand.
East European Council > News > With our assistance, an interview with Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, was arranged for Wirtualna Polska

“Poland is an unconditional strategic partner for Ukraine, and the opening of the archives may be the beginning of a full historical agreement,” Mykhailo Podolak, the chief adviser to the President of Ukraine and the negotiator in talks with Russia, told Virtual Poland. At the same time, Ukraine is facing a crisis: changes at the summits of the army and the Ministry of Defense, protests in the largest cities and disputes around mobilization.

Mateusz Lachowski: Let’s start with Polish-Ukrainian relations. Ukraine was to block Poland’s participation in part of the missile defense coalition’s initiatives and countering ballistic threats. Was that really the case?

We understand all the discussions – historical and humanitarian – that are taking place in Polish society today. We also understand that they are partly part of the internal political debate in Poland. However, when it comes to cooperation between our countries, we consider Poland an unconditional strategic partner.

What does this mean in practice? Because it’s not the answer to the question.

We are interested in developing mutual trade, the common economy and making money together in various sectors – especially in the defense industry, within the framework of the alliance of Ukraine and Poland. That is why Poland is an important partner for us in all projects.

It is an investment partner with which it is worth creating joint enterprises. We are neighbours and together we can build a very strong arms sector. Ukraine is actively cooperating with Polish partners on many levels, and our relations with the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk are constructive.

You don’t mention the relationship with the presidential palace. Despite the difficult topics, do you believe that relations between Poland and Ukraine can be rebuilt?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. We understand that there are problems that need to be solved. There have been crisis situations, but I believe we are able to go through them with dignity – often it is the crises that allow us to build a more mature partnership. If the parties are ready to talk even about difficult issues, look for compromises and common solutions, while understanding that security is the overriding issue – that is, relationships have a solid basis.

Russia has not given up on trying to destabilize Poland. We see cyberattacks on Polish infrastructure and extensive propaganda activities against Poland. At the same time, we understand the concerns present in Poland – regarding the European integration of Ukraine and other issues. However, the President of Ukraine remains as focused as possible on a constructive dialogue.

How do you assess the meeting with President Karol Nawrocki?

I think it was a good conversation. It gives rise to cautious optimism that Polish-Ukrainian relations will return to the level of the first years of a full-scale Russian invasion. In my opinion, it was an exceptional level of relationship – a real strategic partnership. It gave hope for the creation in Central and Eastern Europe of a strong alliance between Poland and Ukraine, which could have a real impact on the processes taking place throughout Europe.

I will ask you about the Order of the White Eagle. How did President Zelensky accept this decoration from him?

I cannot speak on behalf of the president or comment on his personal emotions. I can only say that – in my opinion – the withdrawal of this decoration was the wrong decision. But what happened happened. I don’t want to go back to the emotions she has.

The most important thing is that the President of Ukraine remains a pragmatic and constructive politician. He wants Ukraine – also thanks to cooperation with Poland – to receive all the necessary instruments for effective defense against Russian aggression. That’s why he’s doing everything he wants to do to maintain a constructive relationship with all partners.

Proposal to open archives – is it a political gesture whether there really are materials in the Ukrainian archives that can explain the contentious issues? Is there a real will in the President’s Office to show that Ukraine understands the Polish sensitivity and pain associated with history?

This is an important signal that we understand how painful and important this issue is for Poland. Therefore, we believe that the discussion should be as open as possible, and all the information – disclosed. If you have to go through difficult and painful conversations, we are ready for it.

Personally, I am very interested in Poland being an integral part of the strong alliance between Poland and Ukraine. I see great potential in this – both for the post-war impact of our countries on European policy, as well as for economic development, security and defence cooperation.

The President sends a clear message: we understand why there is a discussion about history in Poland, and we understand the pain that Poland has experienced. We are ready for an open dialogue — and I believe that the first steps in this direction are constructive. The opening of the archives, the establishment of the names of all the victims and the exact course of events may be the beginning of a full historical agreement.

Poland and Ukraine are doomed to cooperate?

I wouldn’t say they’re doomed to her. I’d rather say they have a special chance. We are neighbours – we share common interests in the security, economy and future of Europe. If we can solve the most difficult historical issues with mutual respect, our partnership will be even stronger than before.

Ukraine is in a political crisis today. After Minister Mykhail Fedorov’s dismissal, protests broke out in large cities – people demanded his return and the resignation of General Oleksandr Syrsky. Eventually, the president dismissed Syrsky from his post as commander-in-chief and appointed General Drapaty in his place. Is this an attempt to get out of the crisis?

There is no doubt a political crisis. At the same time, I would like to stress that management crises are natural in a democratic state. Especially in a state that has been waging an extremely difficult, exhausting and brutal war for many years. In such conditions, it is impossible to avoid tensions, disputes concerning competence, responsibility or decision-making.

The most important thing, however, is not whether the crisis arises, but whether the state can react to it properly. And today, both the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff are under full control – the President is actively overseeing everything that happens in both institutions. He conducts very intensive consultations, analyzes different management models and looks for optimal decisions.

What led to this crisis – a personal conflict or a deeper problem in the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the army command?

The source of the problem was a conflict that may have seemed small at first, but over time began to hinder full cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.In peacetime, similar tensions can be tried to solve for months. You can create committees, have long discussions and gradually determine the scope of responsibility.

(This is about the growing dispute between the Ministry of Defence and the army command. After his resignation, Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that it was Oleksandr Syrski who gave the president an ultimatum and demanded that the minister be removed from the government. Syrian denied these accusations. Zelensky himself explained Fedorov’s appeal “unresolvable conflict” with the commander-in-chief – ed.)

There is no space for this during the war. At this stage of the conflict, it is absolutely crucial to maintain full synergy between the institutions responsible for commanding the army and those responsible for its supply, financing, armament and cooperation with foreign partners. If one part of the system operates according to a different logic than the other, delays, misunderstandings and problems with the implementation of the decision immediately appear. And during the war, any such delay has real consequences on the front.

So it wasn’t just about the relationship between people, it was about the lack of a uniform mechanism for managing the entire defence sector?

Exactly. Yeah.

Of course, in every institutional conflict, there is also a personal element. Everyone has their own experience, their own assessment of the situation and their own way of making decisions.

However, the president is looking at the issue more broadly. He’s not only interested in who’s left in a dispute with whom. He is primarily interested in whether the whole system works effectively. The Ministry of Defence and the General Staff cannot function like two separate structures, which only exchange information from time to time. They have to act as one organism. The military command should clearly define operational and strategic needs. However, the Ministry should provide everything necessary for their implementation.

What does the President’s involvement look like in practice today? Does Volodymyr Zelensky personally hold talks with commanders?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. And he does it every day.

The President conducts numerous consultations with the military responsible for both operational and strategic command. He talks with the commanders of the brigades, corps, with the representatives of the General Staff, as well as with those directly responsible for individual directions of hostilities. These are not conversations conducted solely at the level of general reports.

The President wants to understand how specific decisions affect the situation on the front, what the availability of equipment looks like, what are the needs of individual units and where organizational problems arise. At the same time, there is already a full understanding of how the Ministry of Defence should function in the new arrangement.

What is the primary role of the Ministry of Defence?

The basic function of the Ministry of Defense is to provide supplies, conduct negotiations with partners, purchase or manufacture weapons and provide it to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Currently, Mr. Chmara is the minister temporarily acting as minister. I believe that everything about the activities of waging war remains under control.

What about the protests? How does the president see them?

All protests, even during the Great War, are unquestionably evidence of the democratic character of Ukraine. They show that we are a mature democracy and civil society actively participates in the life of the state and wants it to function properly.

Did the president analyze the protesters’ demands?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. The president saw these protests and is looking at what reservations and expectations are being raised during the demonstrations. He emphasizes that in each case, optimal decisions will be made from the point of view of the further conduct of modern, technologically advanced war. The President reacts to such manifestations of social activity and quickly makes decisions improving the functioning of the state.

There is still mobilization. In Ukraine, there were about 600 cases of aggression against TCK employees – field restoration centers. Does the President’s Office have a concept of what mobilization should look like?

Mobilization is indeed a very difficult process. In the 21st century, it is extremely difficult to convince people to participate in a war that has been going on for four and a half years, is extremely bloody and brutal, and carries a huge number of casualties. This is a huge psychological burden – both for individuals and for society as a whole.

You have to remember the scale of this war. The front line is about 1300 kilometers long, hundreds of thousands of people are involved. On the Russian side, in the occupied territories, there are more than 700 thousand soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The current model of mobilization did not work?

The president openly says that the current model of mobilization is not appropriate – it is not fair enough and requires modernization and profound transformation.

Who should prepare the reform?

This is not only the problem of the Ministry of Defence – it is the shared responsibility of the Ministry, the General Staff and the Parliament. We need to find a model of mobilization that, although difficult, will be accepted by society as much as possible.

What should change in it?

In my opinion, we should follow the path of greater financial motivation: higher salaries, more social benefits, stronger medical guarantees for people who are injured, and more guarantees for mobilized families. This is a difficult process, because people, for obvious reasons, are not ready for what war is – they need to be properly prepared for it.

The president insists that the new Minister of Defence and the General Staff take additional action to create a new model of mobilization.

What model does the president expect?

A more humane and transparent model – one that clearly guarantees the rights of persons appointed to the service, and provides adequate protection and rights to their families. All these solutions must be worked out jointly by the parliament and the relevant parliamentary committees, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.

You’ve been in Kiev since the beginning of the war, close to the president. What stage of the war is Ukraine at today? Is the situation better from the perspective of the past year?

In my opinion, today all the masks have completely fallen. It became clear who was who in this war and what he was really fighting for. The Russian Federation is waging a war involving the destruction of large Ukrainian cities. It hits civilians, infrastructure, city centres and densely populated areas.

Is this Russia’s main goal today?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. I mean cities like Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Kharkiv, Kiev or Odessa. Every day, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones fall there. Cities located closer to the front line are additionally attacked with guided bombs and artillery.

Today, Russia’s primary goal is simply to destroy the largest Ukrainian cities and break our morale. This means that it is waging a war against civilians.

At this stage of the war, it has become clear that the strategic initiative is no longer on Russia’s side. Of course, Putin lives in his own reality, in which he constantly prevails. However, he does not ask himself the basic question: how can you say that you win a war, when for four and a half years fights have been fought practically in the same area, especially in the Donetsk region?

That is Putin. In my opinion, all the masks have fallen down to him.

So you don’t believe in a political deal and a ceasefire in the near term?

Putin does not intend to conclude any agreements – he will not end this war voluntarily. He will only end it when he is forced to do so and when he begins to feel fear. Russia will continue to try to sell the world the concept of its influence by escalating conflicts and waging war – virtually giving up other foreign policy instruments and saw the war as a basic tool for building its position.

Is the initiative on the side of Ukraine today?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. I want to emphasize this again – I am talking about it carefully, but Ukraine already has the means to destroy Russian logistics practically throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

It can effectively attack arms industry plants, as well as oil and gas sector enterprises – thus limiting Russia’s ability to finance war.

Because Ukraine is also increasingly hitting deep on Russian territory?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. Thanks to long-range measures, Ukraine is able to carry hostilities on the territory of Russia. The idea is for Russian society to begin to understand what war really is. Until now, the Russians have thought that war was something distant – something that can be watched on television while citizens of another state suffer. Russia was used to this way of conducting it. It looks different today.

Ukraine has sufficient resources to virtually completely control the situation in Crimea. It was from Crimea that this war began in 2014 and – in my opinion – its history will also end there. At the same time, Ukraine is trying to control Russian supply lines leading to the occupied territories. We have the means of long-range to attack the logistics of Russian occupation troops and targets in Crimea.

All this gradually changes the situation on the front and affects the course of the war. But I repeat: Putin will not stop the war voluntarily. He has to be forced to do it.

The plan is simple: you want to bring about a situation in which the Russians will start to feel the effects of the war on their own – they will have problems with fuel, with their daily functioning, and this will put pressure on Putin and the Kremlin?

This is the only plan that could lead to an end to this war. Russia has put everything on one card – it does not intend to give up the war as the basic tool of its foreign policy. With it, he wants to maintain influence, build dominance and influence the world. Therefore, it will continue to raise the stakes – more and more often talk about escalation and increasingly attack the civilian population.

How can this be stopped?

Only by transferring the war to the territory of Russia. However, this is not an abstract concept – it means the destruction of Russian logistics and infrastructure, not only military, but also the one that enables the financing of the state and the conduct of war. The Russian economy needs to start to collapse.

At the social level, this should mean serious shortages of fuel, food and other essential products. Russian citizens must feel that war is something real – that it is outside their window, that it means anti-aircraft alarms, destruction and death.

So far, the Russians have not felt this. They could wage war as long as they wanted – they sold oil through unofficial channels, made money on global markets, financed social programs, and ordinary citizens were practically not bearing the cost of war. They did not feel any major economic or financial consequences, they could live normally and enjoy all the facilities of the modern world. Today, they gradually lose it – and lose it very quickly.

Why is this so important?

Because at some point, they’re going to start asking Putin questions. After all, he promised them something completely different – he said that Russia would wage war in such a way that they would sit on the couches and watch them on television, kill themselves and destroy the citizens of other countries. He also promised them the opportunity to benefit from the looting of occupied territories, as in Crimea and other occupied areas of Ukraine. He never promised the Russians that they would have to feel the effects of the war themselves. And when they start to feel it much stronger than today, the social pressure on Putin’s system will be much greater.

Is that why, in your opinion, Russia is increasingly restricting civil rights?

Yes. Yeah. Yeah. To prevent this, Putin is heading down the path of North Korea. We’re already seeing restricting the internet and blocking social media. It is possible that there will also be restrictions on trips abroad – similar to those in the Soviet Union. This means a complete restriction on civil rights. In fact, it must be said that there will be no more rights in Russia. People will be threatened by war and the repression of Putin’s state apparatus.

Do you think that sooner or later the Russians will have to decide whether they still accept this system?

Sooner or later, they will have to make a decision about Putin himself. If they don’t, they’ll live in a camp-like state – but the war won’t go away from that “camp” anyway.

Original text