After Belarusian territory was used by Russian troops to invade Ukraine, the topic of the direct involvement of Belarusian armed forces in the war has been systematically raised in the information space and at the level of political discussions. However, each time the situation remains relatively controlled.
Is Alexander Lukashenko ready to cross the red line again and initiate an invasion of Ukraine or once again provide territories for aggression by Russian troops? Answers to questions in an interview with the director of the Eastern European Council Anton Naychuk.
In recent weeks, the Ukrainian President has been warning about the possibility of Belarus being involved in a war against Ukraine? Is such a scenario realistic?
Unfortunately, the experience of starting a full-scale invasion forces us to take into account all possible scenarios. The Ukrainian command is acting in a similar way, systematically strengthening positions near the Belarusian border. It is necessary to prepare for the worst-case scenarios, even if their probability is quite low.
Indeed, a large-scale audit of the readiness of the armed forces has begun in Belarus, certain technical work is being carried out in the regions near the border with Ukraine, but clear signs of preparation for a full-fledged entry into the war are not visible yet.
In modern technological realities, it is impossible to prepare a large-scale strike without satellite surveillance equipment recording it. If something similar suddenly happens in Belarus, a large-scale accumulation of troops will not go unnoticed.
However, a convincing statement remains that Alexander Lukashenko is afraid of direct involvement in hostilities against Ukraine and will continue to try to avoid this.
Why is Minsk afraid of escalation with Ukraine?
There are quite a few circumstances that form a holistic picture.
First, the war will lead to inevitable losses, which will be critically reflected in Alexander Lukashenko’s ratings. His situation is radically different from the Kremlin’s. The Belarusian army does not want to fight and put itself under attack, the army is not motivated, there will be a question about the generals’ readiness to carry out such instructions. Of course, one should not exclude the factor of Russian influence on certain groups in the ranks of the Belarusian armed forces, but even control over individual generals will not provide the opportunity to mobilize soldiers for war if they oppose it with all their might.
Secondly, the economic component. War is an extremely expensive affair and the Belarusian economy is not ready for this. The Belarusian budget had difficulties even when it had to deploy Russian troops on its own territory, which were undergoing training at training grounds, so what can we say about larger-scale actions.
Thirdly, the political factor – Alexander Lukashenko is interested in maintaining power and safely preparing transit, and in turbulent war conditions all his plans risk being destroyed.
Fourthly, the complete lack of sense of such actions for Belarus. During a long period of isolation, Minsk for the first time has a small window of opportunity for certain maneuvers. Dialogue with the Donald Trump administration allowed to receive an invitation to visit the USA, to weaken a number of American sanctions. The American side situationally supports the idea of unblocking the access of Belarusian potash to the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. Although this is a rather complicated and problematic process, at least – a dialogue about it is underway, which is beneficial for Alexander Lukashenko.
Fifthly, the Chinese factor. China is hardly interested in blocking commercial checkpoints on the Polish-Belarusian border in response to potential aggression from Belarus or even another provocation against NATO countries. After all, Chinese products continue to move by rail to Europe through Belarus, and Beijing would be very disappointed if Alexander Lukashenko agreed to a military adventure. Minsk does not want to allow this. After all, China is a strategic partner important to the United States and the last hope that will keep Belarus from uncontrolled Russian expansion.
What about the option of providing its own territories for Russian aggression?
Unfortunately, the Russian side is still using Belarusian territory for aggression. Remember President Zelensky’s declarations that equipment was located in Belarusian residential buildings that coordinated the control and strikes of drones on Ukraine – primarily on the Kyiv region.
If you ask about the possibility of a second invasion: if the Kremlin makes such a decision, it is difficult to imagine how Alexander Lukashenko will maneuver. Unless he has to turn to China for support.
The question is whether the Russian Federation will now have enough resources for such actions. Currently, the Russian side is suffering record losses. It is difficult to say whether covert mobilization will fully compensate for them.
At the same time, opening a new section of the front will require finding available troops. Without a higher level of mobilization, the transfer of units from other directions, and the direct involvement of Belarusian soldiers, reopening the front from Belarus is problematic. However, with the transfer of troops, the offensive potential in priority directions will be lost, which is not particularly dynamic anyway.
Is the USА really trying to pull Belarus away from Russia? Is this realistic?
I cannot rule out that at the strategic level, Donald Trump is really thinking about such ambitious things. Such geopolitical ambitions can be accompanied by simpler intentions: to get cheap Belarusian potash, to attract business circles from their own environment to get commercial profit from this.
However, I do not believe that the USA can radically change the situation: to put it metaphorically – to turn Belarus to the West.
First, the Belarusian economy is critically connected with the Russian one. Both in trade and energy issues, and in other sectors – including the military-industrial complex.
Belarusian companies receive significant revenues of over a billion dollars from the supply of equipment for Russian military needs.
It is difficult to imagine that Alexander Lukashenko would suddenly decide to break off relations with Russia for the sake of Donald Trump, who will end his term in a few years.
Secondly, we should not forget about China. After all, the Chinese side enjoys much stronger positions in Belarus, especially when compared with the United States.
That is why Alexander Lukashenko will try to get the most benefit for himself from the dialogue with the United States, but at the strategic level it is difficult to expect fundamental changes.
Ukraine has significantly changed its rhetoric towards Belarus, initiated sanctions. Can we expect any decisive action? Are there prerequisites for developing interaction with the Belarusian opposition?
At the moment, what is there can be called decisive. What more? Going to military escalation is not beneficial to anyone, Ukraine can only respond in a mirror to aggressive actions. Looking at the problems Russian air defense systems are experiencing with Ukrainian drones and how the war has spread to Russian territory, it is easy to imagine what would happen in Belarus if the escalation suddenly reached a new level.
However, Ukraine will not initiate the expansion of the geography of hostilities, and political statements and sanctions will continue to take place. In Kiev, they want to demonstrate that Belarusian companies are directly involved in supporting the Russian military-industrial complex, so this cannot be ignored.
Speaking of the opposition: if, frankly, Kiev did not see much strategic importance in such a dialogue, there are problems with its substantive content. A logical question from Ukraine is – what to talk about?
Of course, the Ukrainian side is interested in involving opposition-minded Belarusian citizens in the confrontation with Russian aggression. However, at the political level, the framework of the dialogue seemed quite limited.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya in Lithuania, which was a kind of gesture of goodwill. There is talk of a possible visit of a Belarusian delegation to Kyiv, but it has not yet taken place. There is talk of the possibility of appointing a special representative for work with the opposition, but as far as I know, he has not been appointed yet. It is likely that this should be someone from the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the question of his real functionality is also open?
So far, the most constructive idea seems to be broader institutional work – for a start – within the Lublin Triangle. The creation of an institute of policy commissioners for Belarus, who will develop a strategic vision of the policy as a whole, and also offer effective practical solutions here and now. They will go far beyond the dialogue with the opposition, and will be responsible for strategically important things – security issues, countering illegal mechanisms for circumventing sanctions, etc. Relevant initiatives have already been taken by Ukraine at the parliamentary level, but their implementation requires political will.